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I. Common Law Rules
A. An Introduction to Principles and Policies
Lawyers are not especially concerned, in the arguments they make
or the explanations they give, to distinguish principles from poli-
cies. 1 This is true of all branches of the profession, the judicial and
academic, as well as the practicing bar. And it is unfortunate, for
we can learn something about adjudication, perhaps more than a
little, by attending to the distinction.
Consider two cases, the first deceptively simple. The beneficiary
of a life insurance policy murders the insured in order to collect
the insurance. He is caught, convicted of homicide, and in a separate
proceeding denied payment. In the process a rule is announced by
the court that a beneficiary who intentionally takes the life of the
insured may not collect the insurance.2
The second case is more complex. A buyer, licensed by the sec-
retary of agriculture, purchases a carload of cantaloupes warranted
to be "U.S. gTade one." The terms of his contract ("acceptance
final") preclude the buyer from rejecting the produce. Yet, he re-
jects because the cantaloupes do not conform to the warranty. Not
only is the buyer held liable for his breach, but he is also deprived
of his claim against the seller. The rule, as stated by the court, is
that under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, a buyer
who improperly rejects a shipment forfeits any cause of action for
breach of warranty (growing out of the same transaction) that he
might have against the seller.3
In each of these cases two types of explanations for the announced
rule can be attempted. The rule in the insurance case might be
explained on instrumental grounds: It is designed to deter the in-
tentional taking of life. The instrumental, to the contrary, might
be ignored and the explanation given that it is improper for the
beneficiary to collect the insurance since a wrongdoer should not
profit from his own wrong. There is, of course, nothing necessarily
incompatible in these two explanations. Indeed, both might well be
advanced by judge or commentator as joint reasons for the rule.
1. But cf. Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963); Dworkin, Morality
and the Law, N.Y. REV. BooKs, May 22, 1969, at 29; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HAV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). See also Tribe, Technology Assessment and the
Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617
(1973).
2. See, e.g., Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St. 208, 92 N.E. 26 (1910).
3. L. Gillarde Co. v. J. Martinelli 8, Co., 168 F.2d 276, vacated on rehearing and newo
judgment entered, 169 F.2d 60 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948).
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The cantaloupe case might also be explained in instrumental terms.
The forfeiture rule is drawn from the purpose of the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act, which is to deter the improper re-
jection of perishable goods in order to reduce the economic waste
resulting from rejection. A noninstrumental explanation would look
to the gravity of the buyer's breach. His was a promise of such sig-
nificance to the transaction that his failure to perform requires the
forfeiture of his claim quite apart from the effect of the rule on
subsequent transactions in perishable commodities.
If it were proffered as a justification, most students of the law
would reject this second or noninstrumental explanation of the rule
in the cantaloupe case. In an arm's length commercial context,
promise-keeping, for its own sake, does not count enough to justify
forfeiture. Most lawyers would probably accept the first, or instru-
mental, explanation as a justification for the forfeiture rule if they
were convinced of the statute's purpose and reasonably persuaded
that the rule would be an effective deterrent.
Deterrence, however, is a doubtful justification for the rule in
the insurance case. While deterrence is desirable, the rule is un-
likely to influence the behavior of one who is on the brink of
knowingly committing the most serious of felonies. The murderer
often will not be aware of the insurance rule and if he commits
homicide and is caught, he will not enjoy the money, no matter
what the rule is as to insurance. If he is not caught, the crime will
pay and the insurance rule will not matter.
The insurance rule nevertheless is law and, most lawyers would
say, good law. A wrongdoer should not profit from his own wrong
-at least in this case he should not-even though the rule has no
discernible effect on the incidence of homicide. That a wrongdoer
should not profit from his own wrong here counts enough to serve
as a justification for the rule. I shall call such a justification a
principle. In contrast is the justification for the rule in the canta-
loupe case, which I shall call a policy.4
2.
The distinction advanced thus far between principle and policy
-the latter is an instrumental justification for a rule, while the
4. The distinction has at least some relationship to the distinction between deon-
tological and teleological theories. In the next portion of these notes, however, I may
be understood by some to be denying the validity of the distinction. See pp. 223-25 infra.
Cf. R.M. HARE, THE LANCUAC.E OF MORAIS 56-58 (1952), and R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND
REASON 123-24 (1963).
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former is not-may seem fragile. That a wrongdoer should not profit
from his own wrong is itself a decisional standard which can be
justified instrumentally. The justification is not that the application
of the standard directly deters homicide, but that a judicial decision
based on it shows that the law takes the standard seriously; this, in
turn, makes the standard more important in the community. And
if it is more important, it is more likely to affect conduct. The
effect, to be sure, is long-run and general. In the long run the in-
surance rule will assist in the socialization of future generations
and society will be that much better.
The trouble with collapsing the distinction between principle and
policy in this manner is that it impedes rather than facilitates one's
understanding of adjudication. If the social sciences were sophis-
ticated enough to trace all the effects on behavior of the rule in
the insurance case 5 and were to demonstrate that these effects were
nil (an admittedly counter-intuitive demonstration), the rule would
not be seriously undermined. The principle that a wrongdoer should
not profit from his wrong counts as a justification for the insurance
rule, even though the rule has no discernible effect on behavior,
because of the principle's relationship to conventional morality: a
relationship that I will subsequently attempt to explain. 6
Some effects of the insurance rule, however, might undermine
its continued acceptance as law. For example, if it were found in a
substantial number of cases that an effect of the rule was to de-
prive the beneficiary's innocent children of adequate financial sup-
port, we might question whether the rule was a good one.1 Observe,
however, that this is a side effect different from the deterrence of
homicide or the socialization of the next generation; desirable side
effects might count as independent justifications for the insurance
rule. My argument is simply that deterrence is doubtful and that
socialization is a secondary justification because the rule would be
accepted in the face of evidence disproving it. An undesirable side
effect cannot, of course, be advanced to justify a rule. It may, how-
ever, weaken it, for there must be a relationship between the per-
suasiveness, or weight, of a principle used to justify a rule and the
consequences of the rule's application.
5. That is to say: (1) the direct effects of the particular rule on behavior; (2) the
supportive effects (the extent to which that rule reinforces other similar rules), and
(3) the undermining effects (the extent to which a contrary rule would undermine
other similar rules).
6. See pp. 243-54 infra.
7. Even if the rule were to have this side effect, it would still vindicate the prin-
ciple that a wrongdoer should not profit from his wrong, and thus there might be
ground for retaining the rule.
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Principles are contextual-the right to privacy, for instance, counts
very differently in different cultures as justification for a rule-
and part of context is the known or assumed side effects of the rule.
Where the side effects are desirable they strengthen the principle,
but clarity requires that these effects also be seen as potentially in-
dependent justifications for the rule. In the terminology I am sug-
gesting, one would say-if he believed it to be the case-that the
rule was justified not only by the principle that a wrongdoer should
not profit from his wrong, but also by the policy of deterrence or
of socialization.
If, on the other hand, the side effects of a rule are undesirable,
the persuasiveness of the principle, as a justification for the rule, is
weakened, and indeed the rule may not survive as law. Whether it
survives depends upon the force of competing principles and poli-
cies available to a court as decisional standards.
3.
Few American lawyers are likely to disagree with one implicit
premise of the position I am urging. The profession generally recog-
nizes that it is an obligation of the courts to justify the rules they
announce and to keep the rules and their justifications up-to-date.
This does not mean that a rule which cannot be justified is not
recognized as law. It does mean, however, that such a rule is un-
stable, and that one is entitled to criticize its continued application.
Nor does it mean that the principles and policies that underpin the
doctrine of stare decisis cannot count as a justification for a rule's
survival in situations where the original justification is no longer
tenable. It means only that a court should stop relying upon the
original justification."
American lawyers-schooled as they are to see law as predominantly
instrumental-are apt to have little difficulty in accepting the argu-
ment that a policy may serve as the justification for a rule. Assum-
ing, of course, that the rule accomplishes what it is supposed to ac-
complish, the only question that a lawyer is likely to raise is whether
a particular policy is one which a court may legitimately employ in
adjudication. Given its pedigree, the policy in the cantaloupe case
is unquestionably legitimate: It was declared by Congress in a valid
8. I use the word doctrine merely to mean a collection of rules. In this sense, stare
decisis is a doctrine made up of rules that relate to an individual's reliance on prior
law-rules justified by principles and policies (see discussion of "surprise" pp. 233-35;
212-43; 254-61 infra)-and rules that relate to the efficiency of judicial administration-
-rules justified by a policy.
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statute which controlled the case before the court.9 Many policies,
however, would not be accepted as legitimate if they were advanced
by a court to justify a common law rule. For example, if the common
law of a state imposes strict liability upon manufacturers for per-
sonal injury resulting from defective products, a court could not
justify a rule which granted an exemption from such liability to
manufacturers of a newly developed product on the ground that
the protection of infant industries is in the state's economic best
interest. Such a policy may be widely regarded as socially desirable,
but the structure and theory of American government would seem
not to lodge authority for granting a subsidy to infant industries
at the expense of other groups-injured plaintiffs and established in-
dustries producing relatively substitutable products-in the courts.
Authority to create a special class and redistribute income to it re-
sides in the legislature. The sense that it is improper for a court
to justify a common law rule with such a policy is so deeply in-
grained that a statute granting a subsidy is not apt to serve as a
source of decisional law in cases not controlled by it. Thus, for ex-
ample, if a legislature were to grant tax relief to an infant industry,
the legislative policy of subsidizing infant industries by tax relief
would not count as even a partial justification for a judge-made
rule exempting such industries from strict liability.
If a policy is to be employed in common law adjudication, it must
not work in so partisan a fashion. A common law policy must be more
neutral than that.'0 To recur to the insurance case, both deterrence
9. The statute is the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a
et seq. 1970. Its constitutionality today seems clear. But see Abe Rafaelson Co. v. Tug-
well, 79 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1935).
10. The legitimacy of common law policies is dealt with in more detail at pp. 236-43
infra.
There is, of course, another way to put the neutrality constraint; namely, that it is
required by that aspect of morality we call justice. Professor H.L.A. Hart is suggestive. In-
deed, one may infer from his statement that the role for common law policies ought to
be less than I suggest. He says,
An important juncture point between ideas of justice and social good or welfare
should be noticed. Very few social changes or laws are agreeable to or advance
the welfare of all individuals alike. Only laws which provide for the most elementary
needs, such as police protection or roads, come near to this. In most cases the law
provides benefits for one class of the population only at the cost of depriving
others of what they prefer. Provision for the poor can be made only out of the
goods of others; compulsory school education for all may mean not only loss of
liberty for those who wish to educate their children privately, but may be financed
only at the cost of reducing or sacrificing capital investment in industry or old-age
pensions or free medical services. When a choice has been made between such
competing alternatives it may be defended as proper on the ground that it was
for the "public good" or the "common good." It is not clear what these phrases mean,
since there seems to be no scale by which contributions of the various alternatives
to the common good can be measured and the greater identified. It is, however,
clear that a choice, made without prior consideration of the interests of all sec-
tions of the community, would be open to criticism as merely partisan and unjust.
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and socialization would seem to be examples of legitimate policies.
They are widely regarded as socially desirable and are neutral in
the suggested sense. As I have argued, however, deterrence is doubtful
as a justification for the insurance rule because the rule does not
deter; and socialization is no more than a secondary justification.
While most of us have faith in the proposition that law is a moral
teacher, we know little about the dynamics of this process of edu-
cation.
While a legitimate policy is easily accepted by American lawyers
as the justification for a rule, principles (in the way that I am using
the term) are not. I have often been asked by students how any
standard can be adopted if it looks backward rather than forward.
This skepticism does not root in a rejection of the conventional
proposition that courts exist primarily to adjudicate disputes on the
basis of preexisting and reasonably knowable rules (although some
students of law have limited faith in that proposition). The skep-
ticism rather is directed toward any noninstrumental account of
the judicial function or any particular legal rule. What a court is
or does can be justified only in terms of anticipated effects. If dis-
putes should be resolved on the basis of preexisting and reasonably
knowable rules, it is because people will then behave in a socially
desirable way.
The position of those who are skeptical of principles can perhaps
be understood best by a typical response that might be given to my
discussion of the policy of socialization as justification for the rule
in the insurance case. The soft version of my argument is that so-
cialization is a secondary justification because we know so little
about law as a moral teacher. In response to this the principle skep-
tic might say that we know, or at least intuit, enough to use the
policy as a primary justification for the rule. This elicits the hard
version of my argument, which assumes that proof of the socializing
It would, however, be rescued from this imputation if the claims of all had been
impartially considered before legislation, even though in the result the claims of
one section were subordinated to those of others.
Some might indeed argue that all that in fact could be meant by the claim that
a choice between the competing claims of different classes or interests was made "for
the common good," was that the claims of all had been thus impartially surveyed
before decision. Whether this is true or not, it seems clear that justice in this sense
is at least a necessary condition to be satisfied by any legislative choice which pur-
ports to be for the common good. We have here a further aspect of distributive
justice, differing from those simple forms which we have discussed. For here what
is justly "distributed" is not some specific benefit among a class of claimants to it,
but impartial attention to and consideration of competing claims to different benefits.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 162-63 (1961). See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
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effect of the rule is nil, but insists that the rule is justified by the
principle that a wrongdoer should not profit from his own wrong
and that that is a principle because it is related-in some as yet to
be explained way-to conventional morality.
To my hard argument the principle skeptic may be conciliatory:
We cannot know that the socializing effect of the rule is nil, nor
can we ascertain how we would react to the rule if we could know.
He may, on the other hand, be more insistent: If the effect of the
rule is shown to be nil, the rule can be justified only by internal
or institutional policies, such as stare decisis; that is to say, policies
that have to do with the institution .of adjudication, policies that
must be followed for the best interest of society. A principle, or
any other concept related to conventional morality, rests on sand,
for, to change the metaphor, conventional morality and anything
related to it is in the eye of the beholder. The judge who attempts
to justify a rule in these terms is saying no more than that he likes
the result.
Why conventional or common morality is more than personal pref-
erence and how courts work with it in adjudication are issues to
be dealt with later." But the argument of the insistent principle
skeptic, if taken in his terms (which insists upon converting prin-
ciples into policies), might prove too much: Judge.made policies
must be regarded as socially desirable. Giving objective content to
the concept of social desirability would present the skeptic with dif-
ficulties not dissimilar to those he confronts when faced with dis-
tinguishing conventional morality from personal preference. In the
insurance case the policy of socialization is a legitimate policy only if
society can be said to desire the behavior which the rule seeks to
establish. One who believes that principles are nothing but per-
sonal preferences may be hard put not to believe this of judge-made
policies as well. Such skepticism entails either a rejection of all com-
mon law or of the proposition that courts have an obligation to
justify the rules they announce. "Because I like it" is not a justi-
fication for a rule; it is an exercise of fiat.
As to the conciliatory principle skeptic, I have already conceded
that principles are contextual and that effects are part of context.
Thus, our disagreement is narrow. Where we disagree, I think he
is wrong, and I shall in the next section, by contrasting commercial
contracts with intentional torts, try again to persuade him, but even
11. See pp. 243-54; 285-311 infra.
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if I fail it does not matter much. For whenever he is wont to con-
vert what I call a principle into a policy, he shall find that his
policy operates in adjudication like my principle and not like what
he and I are both content to call a policy.
B. Strong Duties, Weak Duties, and their Remedial Consequences
4.
Common law rules that are justified primarily by policies are
apt to impose 'duties on individuals different from those imposed
by rules that are justified primarily by principles. The difference
can be seen by contrasting commercial contracts with intentional
torts, that is, by enlarging the discussion of' the cantaloupe and in-
surance cases to the general class of cases to which they belong.
It is a rule of contract law that a person who freely promises to
perform a legal act at a specific future time is under a duty to per-
form his promise if it is bargained for and given in exchange for
goods or services. The promisor's duty, however, is a weak one, for
if at the time of performance the promisor decides (generally be-
cause it is less expensive for him) to pay damages rather than to
perform his promise, his decision in the average case will be vir-
tually condoned.' He is expected to act in his own best interest even
though he is under an obligation to act differently. 13
Some would attempt to account for this by denying it, by insisting
that the breach would be condemned. Their's is an uphill struggle,
for they must contend with the entire law of damages-particularly
the limited role of specific performance-and excuses in contract law.
It generally does not matter-frustration and impossibility are ex-
ceptions-why a contract is not performed. While there are excep-
tions,' 4 the willfulness of a breach (formally at least) is irrelevant
to the question and extent of liability.
Holmes's explanation of the phenomenon described above was to
deny the breach. "Nowhere," he said, "is the confusion between legal
and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract. Among
12. Our attitude toward the promisor who fails to perform changes of course as
we move from an arm's length commercial transaction to a fiduciary relationship. We
would say that we count the principle of promise-keeping more in the latter than
in the former case.
13. The promisor's "best interest" includes the nonlegal as well as the legal con-
sequences of his breach.
14. The most important may be in the application of the Hadley v. Baxendale
rule. See, e.g., McCoRMtIcK ON DXrAcMAs 574-75 (1935).
229
HeinOnline -- 83 Yale L.J. 229 1973-1974
The Yale Law Journal
other things, here again the so called primary rights and duties are
invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be assigned
and explained. The duty to keep a contract at common law means
a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and
nothing else." 15 But Holmes's explanation insisting as it does, that
the promisor's duty is in the alternative, cannot square with the
language of the law, its operation, or the deal of the parties. In the
ordinary case the parties bargain for performance and often fail even
to address the consequences of nonperformance. We describe a prom-
isor's failure to perform his promise as a breach of contract; we do
not describe his duty as being in the alternative, that is, to perform
or pay damages. And where contracts are renegotiated, the law may
treat the initial promise as a preexisting duty. 10
Although Holmes's eoplanation, therefore, is unsatisfactory and
often rejected today, contract theorists have had trouble with the
fact that generally we do not condemn a promisor who acts in his
own best interest.17 If the primary justification for the rule-that a
promise supported by consideration obligates a promisor to perform
-were the principle that a man should keep his word when it is
seriously given in trade and likely to induce a change of position
in others, it would be difficult to explain our attitude toward the
promisor's failure to keep his promise.' 8 How could we come as
close to condoning his breach as we do? Would we not disapprove
of his conduct rather than accept it as the normal behavior of a
rational profit-maximizing individual? I think we would emphati-
cally disapprove, and, if so, a promisor would be under a strong,
rather than a weak, duty.
I do not mean to imply that the above circumstances would require
totally different rules of contract damages, although some rules might
need modification. It is often the case on the civil side that breach
of a duty, weak or strong, results in the imposition of a remedial
obligation to pay compensation and no more. If one believes-as
Holmes perhaps did not-that law, among other things, is attitude
as well as power, one is not driven to assume that there is, or ought
to be, a perfect fit between duties and remedies. We can learn much
about the duty imposed by a rule of law if we investigate the legal
consequences of its breach, but there is much that such investiga-
tion does not teach us.
15. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
16. See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
17. See, e.g., 1A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 182 (1963).
18. The principle is, of course, the secondary justification. Its existence explains
why Holmes's description is troublesome.
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If the primary justification for the contract rule is not a principle,
it must be a policy: promises are enforceable in order to facilitate
commerce. Such a judge-made policy is widely regarded as socially
desirable and, relatively speaking, neutral. It does not, however, have
its roots in conventional morality as does a principle, for example,
that a man should keep his word. The principle that a man should
keep his word is, of course, the secondary justification for the con-
tract rule, and it is the existence of this justification that properly
inhibits us from flatly condoning the promisor who elects not to
perform.
The primary justification for the contract rule is a policy of ef-
ficiency, one aimed at a better allocation of resources. Efficiency
can and has been claimed to be not only the higher, but, indeed,
the only morality.' 9 I do not wish to deny the desirability of an
expanded gross national product, the moral spinoffs from better
resource allocation, or the existence of a moral commitment toward
work and craftsmanship, a commitment which sometimes may coin-
cide with the concept of efficiency. But efficiency by itself is not
a part of our conventional morality, a part of the underlying values
and attitudes, that translate into "standards of conduct which are
widely shared in a particular society .... ,1"20 and that constitute the
raw material from which the law derives principles.2 1 This is not to
say, of course, that efficiency is immoral, or that many rules which
are justified by principles cannot be examined for their impact on
efficiency. Such examination is an important-perhaps the most im-
portant-task for the lawyer-economist.2 2 I do mean to say that we
hinder our understanding of adjudication if we confuse efficiency
with morality. This point can be focused more sharply by turning
from contracts to intentional torts.
23
It is a rule of tort law that to inflict intentional physical harm
upon another without cause is illegal. This rule imposes a strong
19. See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 253-57 (1971), for a contemporary
statement.
20. H.L.A. HART, supra note 10, at 165.
21. Cf. Arrow, Somehow, It Has Overcome, N.Y. Times, March 26, 1973, at 39, col.
2. Observe that I am talking about conventional or common morality, and not about
the relative merits of a wise philosopher's ethical system, derived from one or another
form of utilitarianism, as contrasted with either a theologian's or wise philosopher's
system that ranks values according to divine will or some form of contract or intui-
tlonist theory. See pp. 279-80; 285 mfra.
22. See, e.g., G. CALABRESi, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
23. I recognize that there is an approach to this subject very different from the
one I shall present. It is an approach employed by Calabresi and Melamed to in-
vestigate a related set of problems. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
Their presentation is elegant, sophisticated, and important. It is, as they call it, "one
view of the cathedral." See id. at 1089-90 n.2. What follows is another view.
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duty upon the potential tort-feasor: we would not think of con-
doning his assault because he stood ready to compensate his victim.
We would condemn his assault although he paid a full measure of
damages.
I would contend that the primary justification for this tort rule
is a principle, but one might undertake to justify it by resort to
policies. First, the law wishes to deter assault and battery. This is
doubtful as a justification for the same reason as in the insurance
case: the criminal law is there; civil liability may add some deter-
rence, but probably little. Second, the law wishes to improve the
allocation of resources in society. The victim has been injured by
the assault, the injury is an externality, and assuming that the tort-
feasor is the least expensive cost avoider, the cost of the externality
should be imposed upon him.
If this latter, efficiency policy were the sole justification for the
tort rule, we would condone the conduct of the tort-feasor once he ten-
dered full compensation. It is also the case that Holmes would have
been more nearly correct about contract law, if its rules were jus-
tified solely by policies of efficiency.2 4 Moreover, if the efficiency
justification for the tort rule were-as similar policies in contract
law are-the primary justification, we would regard the tort-feasor as
we regard the contract-breaker: a rational, profit-maximizing indi-
vidual.
This distinction between a strong and a weak duty does not con-
fuse a legal with a moral obligation. Yet it might mistakenly be
thought to entail such a confusion. The argument would go as fol-
lows: While Holmes is wrong in declining to admit to a distinction
between duties and remedies, it is also wrong to assume that our
condemnation of the intentional tort-feasor, or our failure to con-
demn the contract-breaker, traces to a legal duty rather than to a
moral one. Attitudes toward wrongdoers are only the reflection of
moral conviction.
Our attitude does reflect our moral conviction, but where that
moral conviction is the basis of a legal rule (as it is where the rule
is justified primarily by a principle), it is confusing to insist that
our attitude toward one who breaks the rule and pays damages is
only a moral attitude and not a legal one.2-5 Indeed, to hold such a
24. The secondary justification is a principle. See note 18 supra.
25. Where the legal rule is justified by a policy it is confusing to deny to law a
share in framing our attitude toward the rule-breaker who pays damages. It is not
only confusing, it makes it very difficult to account for the growth of the common
law, as the subsequent discussion suggests.
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position, it would seem to be necessary to go all the way with
Holmes: He argued that the legal duty in torts-as well as in con-
tracts-is only a duty "to pay a compensatory sum."2 6 If he is mis-
guided-and he plainly is-about contracts, he just is wrong about
intentional torts.
5.
To speak of weak and strong duties clarifies our understanding
of legal rules and, as I shall attempt to show, helps to explain at
least one aspect of the growth of remedial law. The breach of a
strong duty (one created by a rule that is justified primarily by a
principle) empowers a court to pay less attention, in the remedy
it fashions, to the surprise of the defendant than does the breach
of a weak duty (one created by a rule, primarily justified by a policy).
If the buyer in the cantaloupe case knew he was in breach of duty
when he rejected the shipment of cantaloupes, should it have mat-
tered to the court in imposing forfeiture that he did not know and
had no way of knowing that a consequence of his breach would be
the loss of his warranty claim against the seller? In the actual case
those were the facts and the court had considerable difficulty with
the problem. It was only on rehearing and after the intervention of
the secretary of agriculture, who urged the drastic remedy, that the
court ordered forfeiture.
2 7
The decision on rehearing was wrong. While the policy of the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act justifies a rule of forfeiture,
it was improper to apply the rule in the case before the court. The
buyer could not have anticipated forfeiture, for there were no pub-
lished decisions or regulations to warn him that forfeiture was the
method which would be used to deter rejection.28 The conventional
understanding, based on the remedial law of sales contracts, was that
a rejection would result merely in compensatory damages.2 9 It can
be assumed that the buyer relied upon this understanding when he
decided to reject. The nice question for the court, therefore, was how
to count this reliance.
26. Holmes, supra note 15, at 462. Indeed, Holmes sees the duty in contracts and
torts as a "prediction" of what a court will do.
27. See L. Gillarde Co. v. J. Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60 (Ist Cir. 1948).
28. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AMD APPLICATION OF LAW 46-49 (tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HART & SACKS].
29. The buyer will be liable for the price, the seller for breach of warranty. See
L. Gillarde Co. v. J. Martinelli & Co., 168 F.2d 276 (lst Cir. 1948).
Under the statute, the secretary of agriculture had the power to promulgate regu-
lations, and a regulation he might have promulgated, but did not, was forfeiture for
improper rejection. See 7 U.S.C. § 4990 (1970). See also discussion pp. 254-61 infra, of
prospective and retroactive law making.
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The answer to that question should depend upon the nature of
the buyer's duty. If he had reason to believe that, although he stood
ready to pay the seller what the law seemed to require, his breach,
nevertheless, would be condemned, it is hard to see why his surprise
over forfeiture should count. The law's condemnation would con-
stitute a sufficient warning or signal to the buyer. The signal would
say, in effect: "Do not, on the basis of existing remedial law, make a
careful calculation as to the cost of a breach and expect a court to
accept the cost-benefit analysis as a reason for not changing the law.
Your duty is not discharged by paying compensatory damages if
there are independent reasons for imposing additional sanctions. In-
deed, your case is analogous to the insurance case. There, too, the
duty was a strong one and the law's signal clear. Thus, if the con-
ventional understanding of the remedial law, at the time the bene-
ficiary took the life of the insured, had been that the insurance
would be paid to the beneficiary, the latter's surprise at a contrary
decision would not deter a court from denying him the insurance."
The fact is that, in the cantaloupe case, the law did not furnish
the buyer with this kind of signal. His was a duty not to reject, but
it was to be anticipated that he would conduct himself as a rational,
profit-maximizing businessman. To do this successfully, he had to
pay close attention to many factors, not the least of which was the
monetary cost of rejection imposed by the law. The signal he re-
ceived told him that profit-maximizing behavior, while not necessarily
encouraged, would be condoned. If one believes that signals are an
important part of law and that courts must respect reliance upon
them, one is bound to conclude that forfeiture was improper.30
The cantaloupe case may profitably be contrasted with the 1923
decision of the New' York Court of Appeals in Oppenheim v.
Kridel,31 holding a woman, for the first time, liable for the tort of
criminal conversation.3 2 Criminal conversation is the civil counter-
part of the crime of adultery. While the crime applied to women,
the common law's benighted view of the female had served as a
shield against civil liability. Legislative reform and judicial enlight-
enment made the Oppenheim decision possible. But what of Ms.
Kridel's surprise when she found herself under a judgment requir-
30. The buyer's duty in the cantaloupe case does not become a strong duty (in
the sense that I am using the term) because forfeiture is added to the legal con-
sequences of a breach. The buyer still receives a signal to act as a profit maximizer.
The rules that surround his transaction are still based on an efficiency-type policy.
31. 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
32. The court put the question its the case in terms of whether "a wife (can]
maintain an action for criminal conversation as well as a husband." Id. at 158, 140
N.E. 227.
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ing her to pay Mrs. Oppenheim damages? Suppose Kridel had
claimed at the trial that she took the risk of having an affair with
Mr. Oppenheim after carefully weighing all the consequences of
being caught, that her decision was a close one, and that it would
have tipped the other way had she known the possible dollar cost
of her unleashed passion. There is little doubt that such a defense
should be rejected. Kridel was under a strong duty. The law's signal
made it clear that her cost-benefit analysis would not count as a
defense.33
C. Policies and Principles as Sources of Law in a Democracy
6.
The role of surprise is also important in adjudication where a
defendant claims that he did not know, and could not have known,
that he was under any duty to act in a fashion different from the
way in which he did act. Such a defense is central to the problem
of the growth of decisional law and to the subsidiary question of
when a court should announce a rule prospectively rather than ret-
roactively, as the older common law tradition dictates. These diffi-
cult issues can be profitably analyzed by employing the distinction
between principles and policies.
The underlying problem about the gTowth of decisional law re-
sults from the task judges face when they attempt to comply with
the two sets of obligations under which they must labor. The prob-
lem may be put this way: It is the conventional wisdom that courts
exist primarily to adjudicate disputes. A dispute generally concerns
the legality of someone's conduct and it is expected that the le-
gality of the conduct will be judged as of the time it took place. It
is also expected that the judging will be in accordance with rea-
sonably knowable, preexisting rules.
34
The received understanding, moreover, is that courts must justify
the rules they announce and keep those rules and their justifications
up-to-date.35 This latter requirement implies change; the former, sta-
bility. How a court should cope with the tension thus produced de-
33. Observe that I am talking only about surprise. The law's remedies must satisfy
other criteria if it is to be just; even as in the criminal law, the punishment must
fit the crime.
34. Some may prefer the word "standards" to the word "rules." For my purpose,
I do not think it matters. Compare Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REV.
14 (1967), with Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972).
35. If courts did not justify rules, if they just announced them, the task of de-
termining how the rule would articulate in other factual contexts would be sub-
stantially more difficult.
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pends in part upon whether the primary justification for a rule is
a principle or a policy. Why this is so requires a closer look at
principles and policies and attention to some of their characteristics
which I have alluded to, but, until now, postponed discussing.
I have claimed that when a court justifies a common law (as dis-
tinguished from a statutory or constitutional) rule with a policy, it
is proceeding in a fashion recognized as legitimate only if two con-
ditions are met: The policy must be widely regarded as socially
desirable and it must be relatively neutral.30 While recognizing
that there will always be problems of degree and foreseeability,'37
a court should not use a policy if it imposes disproportionate bur-
dens on a particular group (as contrasted with the population gen-
erally), unless there are special reasons that can be adduced for im-
posing those burdens.38 As will be seen the above requirements greatly
limit judicial power. They are not self-evident; however, the first
probably requires less by way of explanation than does the second
to be perceived as part of conventional practice.
The conditions of social desirability and of neutrality are required
by the conception and practice of American democracy. Perhaps the
point can best be developed by considering the objections one might
have to common law rules that seem justified by policies failing to
satisfy either or both conditions. I have given one example earlier, the
policy of protecting infant industries.30 But let us consider a more
complex example. Would it be proper for a court, over time, to es-
tablish a set of common law rules regulating labor disputes that
were justified by the policy (announced without legislative authority)
of promoting collective bargaining?
The first question is whether collective bargaining is widely re-
garded as socially desirable at the time the rules are announced.
The phrase is inescapably, and purposely, imprecise. It does not im-
ply a unanimous view, nor even a consensus. It does require that
there be a substantial and respectable body of opinion in support
of the policy. The way in which a court can tell whether a policy
is widely regarded as socially desirable is to look, first of all, to the
corpus of law-decisional, enacted, and constitutional-to determine
whether relevant policies have received legal recognition. The policy
36. See pp. 226-27 supra.
37. Cf. Solow, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 1696 (1971).
38. Of course it is possible to consider the effect on a specific group as an ex-
ternality and include it as part of the question of social desirability. The separation,
however, aids analysis.
39. See p. 226 supra.
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of protecting an infant industry, for instance, might be recognized
by legislation granting tax relief to such an industry.
40
Many policies, embodied though they may be in law, are unstable,
for the extent to which a policy is deemed socially desirable changes
with experience and depends upon power configurations in society.
41
As the power of particular interest groups grows or declines, a policy's
social acceptability may change. Collective bargaining by public em-
ployees is certainly a contemporary example.42
In determining the extent of a policy's social desirability, a court
should examine such things as political platforms, and take seriously
-for this purpose-campaign promises and political speeches. The
media is a source of evidence and so too are public opinion polls.
Books and articles in professional journals, legislative hearings and
reports, and the reports of special committees and institutes are all
evidence.
It is clear that there were various times in this century, prior to
the enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935, when the policy of col-
lective bargaining commanded sufficient public regard to satisfy the
first condition. It was viewed by many as serving a variety of de-
sirable goals: achieving industrial peace; enabling employees to par-
ticipate in their own governance; fostering the establishment of a du-
rable interest group that might operate effectively in the political arena;
and, substituting the collective contract for the private contract which
often imposed harsh working conditions and low wages on employees.43
Yet many were opposed to collective bargaining. 44 The question
must be put whether the first condition of a legitimate common law
policy-that it be widely regarded as socially desirable-is sufficiently
stringent. Should a policy command at least majority support before
it becomes available to a common law court? I think not, although
I understand the temptation to insist upon such a condition, and
some policies may, indeed, satisfy it. Most, however, are not sus-
ceptible to proof of majority support, and it does not seem to me
that courts have ever behaved as if they were limited by so strict
a requirement. Moreover, majority support is a stricture we fail to
40. As remarked above this would not count as even a partial justification for a
judge-made rule granting further protection to the favored industry. But the reason
goes to the policy's lack of neutrality, not to its social desirability. See p. 226 supra.
41. When a policy is enacted by a legislature, a court, of course, must apply the
statute. But see pp. 262-64 infra.
42. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
POLICIS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1969). The problems are discussed in
H. WELLINGTON & R. WVINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971).
43. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROcEss 7-46 (1968).
44. Id.
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impose on other branches of government. We know enough about
interest group politics and public apathy to be confident that many
legislative and executive policies would not be endorsed by a popular
majority. Of course, legislative policies are promulgated only by the
act of a majority of elected legislators and the executive too is elect-
ed. Regular elections are plainly the control, shaping and in re-
serve, that our system lodges in the people. This control is absent
where courts announce policies. But at least as much protection is
provided the people by the second condition under which courts
labor. Common law policies must be relatively neutral; legislative
and executive policies are constrained by no such requirement. The
condition of neutrality (a common law policy is illegitimate if its
burdens are borne disproportionately by a particular group, unless
there are special reasons for imposing those burdens on that group)
is, I submit, one to which courts generally attempt to conform and
sometimes they succeed in their efforts. 45
That the condition of neutrality is required by democratic theory
is perhaps a controversial claim, but it does seem necessary when
one attempts to put aside his own commitment to any particular
policy that fails of neutrality. The condition merely insists that a
judge, who has purposely been insulated from the play of interest
group politics by the structure of American government, ought not
to justify rules by accepting the demands of one interest group at
the expense of another "innocent" group, that may not even be a
party to the litigation. The method of interest group politics is the
method of legislation. It is inconsistent with common law adjudi-
cation in America because there is too little power held in reserve
by the people to make it acceptable.
In the collective bargaining example that is before us, an em-
ployer is apt to be a party in the litigation and one argument for
a set of rules promoting collective bargaining is the claimed failure
of the market to protect the economic interest of individual em-
ployees. Monopsony (a buyer's monopoly), in a strict or modified
form, results in exploitation. One factor of production-capital-
gets more than it would under competitive conditions; another-
labor-gets less. If this were the general economic situation the
45. See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 28, at 866-669.
The citation is, of course, "in gross" and many readers will have a case or two at
the ready to "disprove" the assertion. A case or two does not disprove anything. But
a reasonable man may, after reading hundreds of cases, come away with a conclusion
different from mine. I think most will not, however, particularly if they keep the
principle-policy distinction in mind. Principles often do have effects that disadvantage
"innocent" groups. See pp. 224-25 supra.
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second condition for a legitimate common law policy would be satis-
fied. While collectivizing the employment relationship might not be
an optimal solution to the underlying problem, it is likely to result
in redistribution to the exploited group at the expense of the ex-
ploiter group, without substantially worsening the position of other
groups. 40 Exploitation counts as a special reason for imposing bur-
dens on employers, for although its elimination may not result in
better resource allocation, most of us believe its existence is unfair.4 7
Monopsony, however, may not be typical of the economy. Indeed,
as best we know, it clearly is not.4s And while there may be suffi-
cient short-run imperfections in the labor market4 9 and other rea-
sons, such as industrial democracy and labor peace, to undermine
one's faith in the private employment contract,50 the general ab-
sence of monopsony raises difficulties for establishing collective bar-
gaining through the common law. Should its establishment improve
the economic position of organized employees, the burdens of re-
distribution are most apt to fall upon a particular group in cir-
cumstances where there are no special reasons for that group to
bear them.
This is apt to happen because product prices in the organized
sector will rise, employment in the organized sector will decrease,
and an over-supply of labor in the unorganized sector will depress
the economic position of "innocent," unorganized workers.51
It would appear, therefore, that, whatever the merits of collective
bargaining (and, in my judgment, they are substantial), its promo-
tion is not a legitimate common law policy. It cannot serve as a jus-
tification for common law rules, for it fails of neutrality in the
sense I have employed the term. It is too partisan. This does not
mean that the promotion of collective bargaining is not a legitimate
legislative policy, whether accompanied by a compensating grant to
unorganized workers or not. Nor does it mean that any of the
many judicial rules announced in labor cases before the enactment
of the Wagner Act are wrong or right. All that can be said of those
rules, on the basis of this discussion, is that they cannot be justified
46. See A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 91-92 (1962).
47. It is often easier to decide that a result is unfair than it is to determine what
would be fair. For a discussion of this see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS, supra note 43, at 35.
48. See R. BUNTING, EMPLOYER CONCENTRATION IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS (1962).
49. See generally N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 357-428 (1965).
50. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 43, at 26-38.
51. See A. REES, supra note 46, at 69-99, 194-202. See also Johnson 8 Mieszkowski,
The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium
Approach, 84 Q.J. ECON. 539 (1970).
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by their effect on the collectivization of the employment relation-
ship.52
The collective bargaining and infant industry examples then do
suggest that a policy, if it is to serve as justification for a common
law rule, must be both socially desirable and-relatively speaking-
neutral. I have claimed that this double requirement is imposed
by the conception and practice of American democracy. Another way
to make the point is to stress the comparative institutional advan-
tage of legislatures, as contrasted with courts, in the area of policy
formation.
The traditional statement of this point would emphasize the legis-
lature's comparative institutional advantage in determining the social
desirability of a policy. While there can be no question that the
fact-finding facilities available to legislatures through committee hear-
ings and investigations are frequently helpful and are facilities that
a court cannot command, this advantage is less than meets the eye.
On many issues more than enough factual information is generated
without hearings; legislative facts abound and for every expert there
is his equal and opposite number. Each has published widely; each
researched extensively. Judges, then, often have as many useful legis-
lative facts as do legislators. And they can know, as well as legis-
lators, what is widely regarded as socially desirable by weighing
many of the same factors legislators would take into account in
formulating their own positions. Unlike legislators, they must eschew
parochial and partisan political factors. Like legislators, however,
they must consider the more broadly based factors that I have ad-
umbrated above. Moreover, like legislators, they must choose among
competing, socially desirable policies by determining which is the
more desirable. There is no better process available for selecting
a socially desirable policyY
3
The comparative advantage of the legislature lies elsewhere. First,
it has a vast array of techniques for implementing and monitoring a
policy, e.g., rules to be enforced by courts, the establishment of
administrative agencies that must report back and seek appropria-
tions, tax relief, and tariff assistance. A common law court can rarely
do more than announce a rule and enforce a judgment. Second, the
political arena is more likely to be available to those groups that
52. Compare Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63, cert. denied,
288 U.S. 606 (1932), with 'Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896), and
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
53. But cf. Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963).
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have the energy and interest to plead specially. Politics is the art
of the possible; legislation is the science of accommodation. The
possible is conditioned by the ballot box; accommodation can com-
pensate the "innocent." The judiciary is not so restrained or sus-
ceptible, nor does it have available to it the legislature's largesse.
Since many policies which might serve as justification for rules fail
of neutrality, in that they are too partisan, common law courts, if
they are to exercise power legitimately, are drastically limited in
their capacity to implement policies. This is so even though at any
particular time a policy may be viewed as socially desirable by a
substantial segment of society. In our system of government the
implementation or effectuation of such policies is in the first in-
stance legislative business. Courts that take on this task exercise power
without authority and engage in what can be called acts of judicial
legislation.
7.
Yet there is a line of objection to this conclusion that deserves
attention: In the collective bargaining example, for instance, a court
may have to decide a case that is very nearly in equipoise; that is,
the existing rules and their justifications seem closely balanced. Either
decision A (holding for the union) or decision B (holding for the
employer) seems at least initially possible to the judge. The case
is a hard one, requiring a nice exercise of judgment. The judge,
moreover, is personally persuaded that the promotion of collective
bargaining is good for labor-management relations, and, accordingly,
a wise policy for the nation. He also has concluded that it is a policy
that fails of neutrality. He perceives that decision A will advance
the establishment of collective bargaining; decision B will thwart it.
Must he, on the basis of the above teaching, nevertheless disregard
these perceptions in the decision he reaches?
Such a conclusion, the objection goes, would plainly be wrong; to
ignore the effect on the establishment of collective bargaining in
such a situation is mindless. In the case put, nothing much is at
stake except the effect: the promotion or thwarting of collective bar-
gaining. Therefore, that effect must receive serious consideration by
some decisionmaker.
The answer to this is that a great deal more than the effect on
collective bargaining is at stake. What is at stake, as the prior dis-
cussion should have made clear, is a steady and consistent concern
with the integrity of one aspect of our democratic system and an un-
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willingness to undercut that system for a result that one may, in a
totally noninstitutional and, therefore, totally unreal world, approve.54
8.
Policies which satisfy the conditions of social desirability and neu-
trality tend, nevertheless, to tax the judicial process. Thus, if we
were to assume that collective bargaining was a legitimate common
law policy, an employer who insisted that a rule justified by the
policy was not reasonably knowable to him when he acted would
be raising a potentially serious objection. How seriously a court
should take this objection depends upon the particular rule to be
imposed and the nature of the prior law. The rule may be no more
than an extension of that law, even though the justification for it
is novel. On the other hand, it may be a substantial departure, one
that causes the employer no little surprise and, accordingly, one to
which the employee or union plaintiff is not clearly entitled. This
may happen because policies often tend to be unstable, the extent
of their social desirability turning on changing power configurations
in society. It can happen for other reasons as well, which are illumi-
nated by returning to the question of forfeiture in the cantaloupe
case. I suggested before that the forfeiture issue was a remedial
matter and discussed the case in those terms. 5 Where one is con-
cerned with policies of efficiency, the distinction between remedy
and right tends to blur as that discussion illustrated (and as Holmes
made too much of). Thus, one can view the forfeiture question as
the extinction of the buyer's right to U.S. grade one cantaloupes.
Two questions suggest themselves. Why was the buyer surprised
by the court's ruling? The answer cannot be, as it might be in the
collective bargaining case, that the buyer did not know the policy
that would be employed to justify the rule announced. He can be
taken to have known that the policy of the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act was to deter the improper rejection of produce.
The answer rather is that the policy of the Act could have been
effectuated in a number of ways and that there was nothing in prior
published decisions or regulations to suggest that a rule extinguishing
his right was to be the chosen instrument for furthering the policy.
This problem of potentially alternative rules (and, therefore, of dis-
54. But cf. Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J.L. STUDIEs 351 (1973).
55. See pp. 233-34 supra.
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cretion) available to a decisionmaker is endemic to rules justified
by policies.r6
Second, how can one accommodate the buyer's reasonable claim
that preexisting law gave him a right to grade one fruit and imposed
a duty on the seller to deliver same with the need for law to grow,
which requires the extinction of the buyer's right in these circum-
stances? The answer is to be found in the nature of policies. They
are instrumental justifications for rules. To satisfy the policy here,
the forfeiture rule need not be applied retroactively. The buyer has
already rejected. No judicial decision can change that. Nor is there
reason to suppose that retroactive, as opposed to prospective, appli-
cation of the new rule will better drive home the lesson to buyers
of perishable agricultural commodities as a class. And that alone is
what the policy requires and what the forfeiture rule is designed
to accomplish.
9.
To turn from policies to principles, I have claimed that they de-
rive from conventional morality. Conventional morality is a difficult
concept; difficult, too, is the question of the derivation of legal
principles. Perhaps the place to begin is to recognize, first, that
there is a moral point of view, the features of which divide philos-
ophers. Professor John Rawls's "conception of right" is a good sum-
mary of an aspect of one version. A "conception of right is a set of
principles, general in form and universal in application, that is to
be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering the
conflicting claims of moral persons."
7
Second, as elucidated by philosophers, the moral point of view may
not distinguish between private individuals and individuals acting in
their official capacities.
Third, when one assumes a moral point of view, arguments-
taking the form we normally call reasoning-are possible. R.M. Hare
tells us that the necessary ingredients in moral arguments are: "logic
(in the shape of universalizability and prescriptivity), the facts, ...
the inclinations and interests of the people concerned," and "a cer-
tain power of imagination and readiness to use it."' s Professor Hare
devotes a great deal of attention to some of these ingredients, and
56. The problem is a constant one for administrative agencies working with major
regulatory statutes. Rule-making is a frequent solution, one which the National Labor
Relations Board has resisted. See N.L.R.B. v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
57. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JuSTICE 135 (1971). See generally K. BAIER, THE MORAL
POINT OF VIEW (1958).
58. R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 94 (1963).
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to follow him is to go deeply into moral philosophy which, I be-
lieve, is not necessary here. We need only recognize that when, as
a private individual, we take a moral point of view, we must be
prepared to reason, and that, as a private individual, we will often
have to ask ourselves: "To what action can I commit myself in this
situation, realizing that, in committing myself to it, I am also (be-
cause the judgment is a universalizable one) prescribing to anyone
in a like situation to do the same . . -59
Fourth, in any society's "set" of moral principles (and ideals)-
that is to say, the moral principles and ideals which are widely
shared by the members of the society-there are many that one can
understand only in the context of the society and its history. Such
an understanding may not be important to a private individual who
has the freedom to develop his own set of principles and ideals. How-
ever, for the individual who may be required as an official to take
a moral point of view, understanding his society and its history is
vital.
This brings us to the main subject. I have claimed, in effect,
that when dealing with legal principles a court must take a moral
point of view. Yet I doubt that one would want to say that a court
is entitled or required to assert its moral point of view. Unlike the
moral philosopher, the court is required to assert ours. This require-
ment imposes constraints: Judicial reasoning in concrete cases must
proceed from society's set of moral principles and ideals, in much
the same way that the judicial interpretation of documents (contracts,
statutes, constitutions-especially constitutions) must proceed from
the document.60 And that is why we must be concerned with con-
ventional morality, for it is there that society's set of moral prin-
ciples and ideals are located.
In The Concept of Law, Professor H.L.A. Hart describes conven-
tional morality as "standards of conduct" (that I assume reflect un-
derlying values and attitudes) "which are widely shared in a par-
ticular society, and are to be contrasted with the moral principles
or moral ideals whicl may govern an individual's life, but which he
does not share with any considerable number of those with whom
he lives." 61
59. Id. at 47-48 (emphasis in original).
60. One who has never had to work with ambiguous contractual, statutory, or con-
stitutional language may find this analogy absurd. Surely, he would argue, there always
must be more certainty in the most ambiguous document than there is in a society's
set of moral principles and ideals. He might become less certain about this, however,
if he were to read, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), along with
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1 (1969).
61. H.L.A. HART, supra note 10, at 165.
244
Vol. 83: 221, 1973
HeinOnline -- 83 Yale L.J. 244 1973-1974
Notes on Adjudication
Moral ideals are different from moral principles. Their realization
is "an achievement deserving praise."6' 2 They connect with moral prin-
ciples (which impose obligations) in that they are a guide to the
virtuous, inviting him "to carry forward beyond the limited extent
which duty demands," to be, for example, especially concerned with
the interests of others and to make sacrifices which are not required. 3
A society's moral ideals evolve, but cannot be detached from his-
tory and tradition. One must ask what those ideals have been to
know what they are. This is important because a society's moral
ideals help us understand how its moral principles apply in con-
crete situations. And that is the role of moral ideals that concerns us.
Our concern with moral principles is more' -substantial. And among
the features of such principles that Hart notices, two seem of spe-
cial relevance. First, he states that "[m]oral obligations . . . are within
the capacity of any normal adult. Compliance . . . is taken as a mat-
ter of course .... ,,11 In the United States, that statement, particularly
the latter portion, may seem troublesome 'if conventional morality
is a unitary concept for the entire nation. Regional, racial, ethnic,
and economic differences make the country a sometimes United Sub-
cultures of America. Nor does the problem disappear, although it
may be mitigated, if we take each state to be the relevant unit.
Although the sub-culture problem is real, too much can be made
of it. Much of the cleavage that results from diversity manifests it-
self in interest group politics. Diverse groups can pursue different
policies while sharing a basically common morality. More important,
the melting pot phenomenon is a real one which the events of the
recent past have tended to obscure. The American people have a
history and tradition which interact with their common problems
to fashion attitudes, values, and aspirations that tend toward a dy-
namic, but nevertheless relatively cohesive, society, and that make
it possible to discern a conventional morality. This morality may
impose obligations that sometimes are beyond the capacity of some
normal adults; therefore, compliance with its obligations may not be
"a matter of course." Yet, it is a morality that is at the least knowable
to socialized persons. This is not to imply that individuals would
always agree about the implications of a moral duty or the par-
ticular behavior that a moral principle requires. It is merely to
insist that normal adults know when particular behavior raises
serious moral questions.
62. Id. at 177.
63. Id. at 178.
64. Id. at 167.
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Hart describes a second feature of morality as its "immunity from
deliberate change." He states:
It is characteristic of a legal system that new legal rules can
be introduced and old ones changed or repealed by deliberate
enactment. . . . By contrast moral rules or principles cannot
be brought into being or changed or eliminated in this way....
[S]uch statements as "As from tomorrow it will no longer be
immoral to do so-and-so" and attempts to support these by ref-
erence to deliberate enactment would be astonishing paradoxes,
if not senseless. For it is inconsistent with the part played by
morality in the lives of individuals that moral rules, principles,
or standards should be regarded, as laws are, as things capable
of creation or change by deliberate act. Standards of conduct
cannot be endowed with, or deprived of, moral status by hu-
man fiat, though the daily use of such concepts as enactment
and repeal shows that the same is not true of law.
Much moral philosophy is devoted to the explanation of this
feature of morality, and to the elucidation of the sense that
morality is something "there" to be recognized, not made by de-
liberate human choice. 65
Of course, it is not the case-and Hart never suggests it is-that
because morality "is something 'there,' " it is static and unchanging.
It changes as people's awareness and consciousness change; and they
change as the world of ideas (including law) changes and the cir-
cumstances of life evolve.
Because of its nature-because it is "there," yet changing-the way
in which one learns about the conventional morality of a society is
to live in it, become sensitive to it, experience widely, read exten-
sively, and ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to call
moral obligations into play. This task may be called the method
of philosophy."6
If a society were to design an institution which had the job of
finding the society's set of moral principles and determining how
they bear in concrete situations, that institution would be sharply
different from one charged with proposing policies. The latter in-
stitution would be constructed with the understanding that it was
to respond to the people's exercise of political power; in America,
that means interest group politics.6 7 The former would be insulated
65. Id. at 171 (emphasis in original).
66. Cardozo talks of the "method of philosophy" in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 30-50 (1931). He gives the phrase a meaning different from the one I intend.
67. See, e.g., R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(1961); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); N. POLSBY, COMMUNITY
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from such pressure. It would provide an environment conducive to
rumination, reflection, and analysis. "Reason, not Power" would be
the motto over its door. The empirically minded critic, however,
might insist that finding moral principles and determining how
they bear in concrete situations are tasks for the behavioral scientist
and that the institution should be designed as a research institute
rather than as a philosophical temple. And he would not necessarily
be wrong if his were a country without scarcity of funds, talent,
or time. But the task for a behavioral science institute is formidable.
The scientific discovery of moral principles, their interrelationship
and importance, and the way in which they work in a particular
context, requires a methodology considerably more complicated than
a scientific prediction of which candidate will win an election. Moral
issues are complex and the issues in all their complexities must be
unpacked. A researcher for such an institute could not ask a simple,
straightforward question and expect an answer to have any meaning.
Nor is it generally necessary to use scientific methodology. Speaking
to the related problem of behavioral science criticism of ordinary
language philosophy, Professor Stanley Cavell has said:
[W]e must bear in mind the fact that these statements-state-
ments that something is said in English-are being made by
native speakers of English. Such speakers do not, in general,
need evidence for what is said in the language; they are the
source of such evidence. It is from them that the descriptive lin-
guist takes the corpus of utterances on the basis of whith he will
construct a grammar of that language. To answer some kinds of
specific questions, we will have to engage in . . . 'laborious ques-
tioning' . . . and count noses; but in general, to tell what is and
isn't English, and to tell whether what is said is properly used,
the native speaker can rely on his own nose; if not, there would
be nothing to count. No one speaker will say everything, so it
may be profitable to seek out others; and sometimes you (as a
native speaker) may be unsure that a form of utterance is
as you say it is, or is used as you say it is used, and in that case
you will have to check with another native speaker. And because
attending so hard to what you say may itself make you unsure
more often than is normal, it is a good policy to check more
often. A good policy, but not a methodological necessity. The
philosopher who proceeds from ordinary language, in his use
of himself as subject in his collection of data, may be more in-
POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1963); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
But cf. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 249-61 (1968).
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formal than the descriptive linguist (though not more than
the linguistic theorist using examples from his native speech);
but there is nothing in that to make the data, in some general
way, suspect.
68
An advocate of the method of philosophy, however, might have se-
rious qualms about the design of his hypothetical institution if its
purposes were not only to find moral principles and determine how
they bear on concrete situations, but also to enforce them, or-to
bring it directly to point-to justify legal rules by an appeal to
discovered moral principles.
The major difficulty for the official charged with the task of de-
termining how the moral principles bear in a particular case is in
disengaging himself from contemporary prejudices which are easily
confused with moral principles. He must escape the passion of the
moment and achieve an appropriately historical perspective. This
entails, among other things, disinterested attention to the society's
moral ideals. For such a task, behavioral science methodology is sus-
pect: there is no reason to suppose that the scientist is better able than
others to shed contemporary prejudices. It misunderstands the prob-
lem to put it in terms of "value-free" research. Scientists, as well
as philosophers, live in their society. The problem is interest free
research and here the dangers for scientist or philosdpher are sub-
stantial.
This problem is not entirely solved by the institutions we do have,
but the common law manages reasonably well. Judges do not resort
to moral principles in their pristine form as justification for com-
mon law rules. Rather, those principles are worked through a process
which has some promise of filtering out the prejudices and pas-
sions of the moment, some promise of providing the judge with
distance and a necessary historical perspective.
The process of deriving legal principles is best examined through
example. But first, I must digress for a moment. I have, by impli-
cation, claimed that courts, because they are protected from political
pressures, are better situated to deal with moral principles than
legislatures. Yet, legislators, of course, are often professionally con-
cerned with morality. One cannot begin to think about statutes deal-
ing with the death penalty, contraception, or abortion without com-
ing quickly upon moral questions. Like judges, philosophers, and
68. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, in ORDINARY LANGUAcr: EsSAYS IN PHIL-
OSOPHICAL METHOD 75, 78 (V.C. Chappel ed. 1964) (emphasis in original). But see Mates,
On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language, id. at 64.
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scientists, legislators live in their society. Accordingly, statutes draw
upon and are evidence of conventional morality. 9. But the environ-
ment in which legislators function makes difficult a bias-free per-
spective. It is often hard for law-makers to resist pressure from their
constituents who react to particular events (a brutal murder, for
instance) with a passion that conflicts with common morality. While
we rarely lynch people today, we frequently adopt a "lynching"
frame of mind that is deeply at odds with our moral ideals. Nor is
it an easy matter for legislators to find conventional morality when
there are well-organized interest groups insisting upon moral po-
sitions of their own.
Nevertheless, legislation is law, law which judges are bound to
apply. However, in this country, if truth be told, they are rather
less bound than often is claimed. Not only is there constitutional
review of legislation; there is also statutory interpretation. Both meth-
ods of judicial control of the legislative process may be perfectly
legitimate in our system. Both will be examined in later sections
of these notes with an eye on the distinctions between principles and
policies, 70 but I now return to the derivation of legal principles at
common law.
10.
If an academic with more time than wit were to canvass the profes-
sion for its opinion of important law review articles, he would find
high on the profession's list Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy.71 It is an extraordinary essay by many tests, especially for its at-
tempt to fashion a legal principle from changes in moral perceptions.
Warren and Brandeis do not, in terms, talk of changing morality.
Yet their essay is infused with the idea. After rehearsing how "the
common law, in its eternal youth," moved from the protection of
"corporeal property" to "incorporeal rights issuing out of it," and
then to "the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and
processes of the mind, as works of literature and art, goodwill, trade
secrets, and trademarks," they describe the law's development as "in-
evitable." "The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the height-
ening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made
it clear to men that only part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life
lay in physical things." 72 And the law must continue to grow as
69. See pp. 287, 291 infra.
70. See pp. 262-64 & 265-311 infra.
71. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
72. Id. at 194-95.
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man's understanding of himself and his relationship with others
change and as technology advances. More protection is necessary. This
seems clear to the authors.7
3
They perceive that changes in moral principles do not directly-
even if they do inevitably-change common law. Their purpose,
therefore, is "to consider whether the existing law affords a prin-
ciple which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the
individual . . . ." 74The heart of the Warren-Brandeis enterprise is
the search for this principle by an examination of decisional law.
The quest takes the authors through the cases protecting the right to
literary and artistic "property." They undertake to demonstrate that
the rules announced by the courts granting protection to unpublished
manuscripts often cannot be justified by an appeal to "the idea of prop-
erty in its narrow sense," for "it may now be considered settled that
the protection afforded by the common law to the author of any writ-
ing is entirely independent of its pecuniary value, its intrinsic merits,
or of any intention to publish the same and also wholly independent of
the material, if any, upon which, or the mode in which, the thought
or sentiment was expressed."
7
The earlier cases, however, were not wrong; but their justification
was too narrow. That justification can be enlarged (some would say
transformed) by examining the background from which it is derived:
moral obligations imposed by the "intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon advancing civilization. ' 76 Thus, Warren and Brandeis
say,
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protec-
tion afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it con-
sists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the
enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be
let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the
right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously
prosecuted, the right not to be defamed. In each of these rights,
as indeed in all other rights recognized by the law, there in-
heres the quality of being owned or possessed-and (as that is
the distinguishing attribute of property) there may be some
propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But, obviously,
they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended
under that term. The principle which protects personal writings
73. Id. at 196.
74. Id. at 197.
75. Id. at 203-04.
76. Id. at 196.
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and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical
appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality
not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate
personality.
77
With the principle of an "inviolate personality" as justification,
Warren and Brandeis could urge on the common law rules protect-
ing the individual from gossip spread upon the pages of newspapers
or of photographs displayed without regard to the wishes of the sub-
jects.
Yet, the two gentlemen from Boston may have been too precipitate.
I say this, not because of all the difficulties we have come to see with
the Warren-Brandeis tort,78 but, rather, because even if the two were
right about the morality from which they drew their legal principle
of an "inviolate personality," they could not have known this with
sufficient certainty to entitle them to insist upon the principle as so
all-encompassing a legal justification. Common law courts must go
more slowly. They must be reasonably confident that they draw on
conventional morality and screen out contemporary bias, passion,
and prejudice, or indeed, that they distinguish cultivated taste from
moral obligation. Warren and Brandeis were perhaps unable to make
that distinction.79
While Warren and Brandeis were perhaps too precipitate, some
courts have been too slow. They have discounted, more than is ap-
propriate, the technique employed in The Right to Privacy; for
apart from pace, that article does model better than anything in the
literature the emergence of a common law principle.
11.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. s° is an excellent example
of the inadequate judicial response I have in mind. It is instructive
to inquire what a proper judicial performance there might have en-
tailed. Such inquiry may further illuminate the relationship between
principles and policies.
Abigail Roberson was an attractive person whose photograph the
defendant was moved to use-without her consent-in an advertising
campaign to sell flour. For this she sought damages and an injunc-
77. Id. at 205.
78. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
79. Cf. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 329 (1966).
80. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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tion. No prior judicial decision had granted or denied relief in
similar circumstances; the case was thus one of first impression.
The court's opinion, which denied recovery to Miss Roberson, re-
veals that the issues in the case were framed to a considerable ex-
tent by the Warren-Brandeis article. The court carefully considered
the literary property and other cases which those authors argued
rested on the principle of an inviolate personality. Such an under-
standing of these earlier cases would have carried the day for Miss
Roberson, for, if those cases were premised on that principle, her
claim would seem to have fallen within their logic. On the other
hand, one could (as Warren and Brandeis recognized themselves)
understand the literary property and related cases in more limited
terms, terms which reflected the understanding of the profession before
the appearance of The Right to Privacy. That was the understanding
that did, in 1902, convince the Roberson court. The court found no
property of Miss Roberson in her photographic likeness and felt that
the establishment of a right to privacy was best left to the legislature.
The court was wrong, if Warren and Brandeis were even partially
correct about the morality of the times from which they derived their
principle of an inviolate personality. Their argument might be recast
in a more traditional judicial mold, one which would be more apt
to screen out contemporary bias, prejudice, and passion, more apt to
reduce the influence of cultivated taste.
The Warren-Brandeis description of the growth of the common
law is particularly pertinent in this context: "From corporeal property
arose the incorporeal rights issuing out of it, and then there opened
the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and processes
of the mind ... ."81 They saw this legal development as "inevitable,"
for the "intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening
of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it
clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of
life lay in physical things."8 2
Viewing the "advance of civilization" and its relation to the com-
mon law somewhat differently, one might see a movement from cor-
poreal property rules, justified primarily by principles related to a
powerful moral conception of property as an institution, to rules in-
creasingly, but never totally, justified by policies of a nature similar
to those at work in the law of contract. This is a .movement related
to the growth of the corporation and the rise of credit to what might
81. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 71, at 194.
82. Id. at 195.
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be called the contractualization of the property concept. Finally the
movement leads to the reestablishment, with respect to "property in
the . . . processes of the mind," of rules primarily justified by a
principle: one that has its ancestry in ancient property law, but
that ill fits the then contemporary view of property. As Warren
and Brandeis tell us, while "there may be some propriety in speak-
ing [of] property .. . the principle . . . [is] that of an inviolate per-
sonality. ' ' 3 But the transition to the new justification for a com-
mon law rule must be made gradually; links to the old property
must not be broken all at once. The process must be more evolutionary
than Warren and Brandeis would have it.
The court in Roberson should have attempted to retain the link
while recognizing the emergence of the new principle. This would
have required dividing the problem into manageable segments.
Adjudication does not require that the judge fashion a fully con-
ceptionalized tort, one that accounts for the unknown future. Ad-
judication required only a determination of how the emerging
Warren-Brandeis principle should have counted in the Roberson fact
situation and this should have been determined by a judicial re-
examination of doctrine.
The court in Roberson faced a situation in which the invasion
of privacy commercially benefited the invader. Miss Roberson could
have entered into an enforceable contract with the defendant. The
use of her likeness would have served as consideration for its promise
to pay her cash. In this sense, her likeness was property which was
taken without compensation or consent. The defendant was unjustly
enriched, for the rules that comprise the legal doctrine of unjust
enrichment are themselves supported by a combination of principles,
derived from common morality, and by policies similar to those
found in contract law. Roberson required the court to acknowledge
the growing weight of one of these principles: "that of an inviolate
personality."
Miss Roberson, therefore, should have been compensated for the
defendant's invasion of her privacy. Its continuing invasion should
have been enjoined. The common law, when reexamined in light
of changing morality, dictated that privacy in her case should have
been treated as a property right, while instructing the judge how
to count the principle, and allowing him to award damages for her
pain and suffering. There is nothing in the doctrine of unjust en-
83. Id. at 205.
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richment that would deny such recovery. One does not know what
the reasonable value of her likeness was except in terms of her pain
and suffering. She did not consent and probably would not have,
but the best a court can do is to assume that under any circum-
stances she would not have consented for less than the emotional
cost entailed in seeing her picture used to sell flour.
To recognize a principle, such as the principle of an inviolate per-
sonality, by relating it as closely as possible to existing doctrine is
a way in which common law gTows and the way in which new rules
justified by principles emerge. It is the process that protects the
people from the philosopher-king or the behavioral science pan-
jandrum; it is to the method of philosophy what the vote is to the
method of politics.
8 4
D. The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Decisional Law
12.
I have attempted, through example, in the prior sections to ac-
count for the evolution of a common law rule, justified by a prin-
ciple. But would there be a problem if Abigail Roberson had won
her lawsuit? The Rochester Folding Box Co. would then have been
enjoined from continuing to display her photograph; it also would
have been under a judgment to pay her damages for its past conduct.
And with respect to damages, might the company claim unfair sur-
prise? To borrow from an earlier formulation in this paper, Ro-
chester's argument might go as follows: It is the received understand-
ing that courts exist primarily to adjudicate disputes. The dispute
between Roberson and the Rochester Folding Box Co. is over the
84. Roberson is a case in which the plaintiff is asking a court to determine the
weight of a principle by a reexamination of doctrine. The plaintiff wants the court to
increase the ambit of legal protection, to create a tort. One can imagine a case in
which a defendant asks a court to reexamine the weight of a principle, by a re-
examination of doctrine, in order to shrink the ambit of legal protection. See Oppen-
heim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923), the criminal conversation case
discussed earlier, pp. 234-35 supra. Oppenheirn held that the tort could be committed
by a woman against a woman. Suppose the defendant had argued, not as she did (that
a woman, unlike a man, had no cause of action), but that the principle of privacy,
with respect to sexual behavior, evolving as it was and increasingly being recognized
at law, required the court to abolish the tort of criminal conversation, and that this
was particularly so since the criminal law afforded adequate protection to the insti-
tution of marriage. The defendant's case is a hard one to make out, given the then
New York adultery statute. It invites the court to perform a task that is, however,
"meet and fit" for the judicial process. Nothing could be less in order than for the
court to say to the defendant: "you are asking us to legislate. The proper forum,
therefore, is the legislatture." Such language here is as inappropriate as it was in the
actual Roberson decision. There is no difference between applying principles to shrink
law or to expand law.
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legality of the company's use of Roberson's photograph. It is ex-
pected that the legality of that use be judged as of the time it took
place. It is expected, moreover, that legality be determined in ac-
cordance with reasonably knowable, preexisting rules. When Ro-
chester began using Roberson's photograph, there was no rule making
its use illegal. Accordingly, while the above discussion suggests that,
for the future, such use be banned-for courts must keep rules and
their justifications up-to-date-that discussion should have no appli-
cation to the past. To apply the rule retroactively is to sacrifice Ro-
chester to the growth of common law. Such a sacrifice is unfair. It
is also unnecessary. The rule should be applied prospectively, and
the injunction is, therefore, proper; damages, however, are not, and
for the same reason that forfeiture was improper in the cantaloupe
case.8r
This argument is without merit because it dramatically misun-
derstands the justification for the rule that would grant damages
to Miss Roberson. That rule is reasonably knowable and preexisting
within the convention of common law adjudication.
To be sure, if the common law were a game-like chess or base-
ball-Rochester would have cause to complain. For if common law
were a game, it would differ in two relevant respects: In the stock
situation, the application of a rule would be unrelated to its jus-
tification; and the common law would be static. Thus, a rule and
its justification would not change. Indeed, one would not say, un-
der such circumstances, that rules must be "reasonably knowable";
one would say that rules must be "knowable." Moreover, the re-
quirement that a rule be "preexisting" would imply a certainty to
which no dynamic enterprise should aspire and which none can
achieve.
Rochester might press its position and admit that the common
law is dynamic. Perhaps, within the convention of common law ad-
judication, the rule protecting Roberson was preexisting and rea-
sonably knowable. The convention, however, presupposed only the
retroactive application of rules. If we relax that constraint, greater
certainty is possible and growth of law still permissible. Once again,
the cantaloupe case and the forfeiture rule come to mind.
Rochester is wrong, the cantaloupe case, distinguishable, and the
key to the distinction is in the difference between principles and
policies. In the cantaloupe case, forfeiture can be justified only in
85. See pp. 242-43 supra.
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terms of its effect. In terms of effect it is a matter of indifference
whether the forfeiture rule is applied retroactively or prospectively.
Given the state of the law at the time the case arose, however, the
retroactive application of the rule constitutes unfair surprise to the
buyer and a windfall to the seller. Under these circumstances, one
can say that as between the parties it would be unfair for the rule
to be applied retroactively. The cost-benefit analysis made by buyer
and seller did not take forfeiture into account.
The background law might have been different. Although there
had been no specific holding, the reasonable implication of prior
decisions might have led informed professional opinion to the con-
clusion that a rejection would entail forfeiture. In those circum-
stances, fairness between the parties would demand that forfeiture
be applied retroactively.
Roberson resembles the hypothetical cantaloupe case. Indeed, all
cases that have any claim to being correctly decided and in which
a "new" rule is justified by a principle are cases where informed
professional opinion knows that the defendant's conduct is potentially
illegal. This follows from the description in the prior sections of the
way law grows: changing morality that is there and knowable to
the normal adult is filtered through existing common law doctrine.
The radical shift in a rule exemplified by the cantaloupe case is
alien to the emergence of a new rule exemplified by Roberson's suit.
There is another way of formulating this point that may help
illuminate it. A rule that is justified by an efficiency-type policy
effectuates that policy. The only reason for such a rule being ap-
plied retroactively is fairness to the parties, who have made a cost-
benefit analysis in reliance upon the rule. On the other hand, a rule
that is justified by a principle vindicates that principle. The only
reason for applying the rule at all is to achieve a fair result between
the parties. By definition, the principle looks to the past; the policy
looks to the future.86
In Roberson the principle that the plaintiff urged on the court
to justify an award of damages and an injunction carried the same
weight at the time of decision and at the time the defendant pub-
lished plaintiff's picture. How much weight a particular principle
86. This may seem an oversimplification; and indeed it is, for in almost every
case both policies and principles are involved. I have recognized that fact from the
beginning. The point I have tried to emphasize, however, is that in most adjudication
one finds that either a principle or a policy is the primary justification for the
announced rule. If Roberson had been decided along the lines I have suggested, the
primary justification for the rule announced would be the principle advanced by Warren
and Brandeis.
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carries may change over time, as the conditions of society change
and as our awareness of them changes in response.
But the change is not that sudden. It follows, if Miss Roberson
was entitled to an injunction, that she also was entitled to damages.
Rochester cannot claim unfair surprise.
13.
If in the Roberson case the New York Court of Appeals had de-
cided a similar case 25 years earlier and had held for the defendant,
how should that prior decision have affected the description of the
judicial process set forth above? The answer is in no way at all.
The function of the court remains the same, namely, to determine
what weight the privacy principle carries in the dispute before it.
The methodology also remains the same: The judge must rethink
and rework doctrine. The doctrine, in view of a decision that bears
importantly upon the case, would, however, be different from what
it was in Roberson itself.
A new and interesting question that the hypothetical Roberson
presents is whether a court, when dealing with a rule justified by a
principle, may overrule a prior decision prospectively, or whether,
as at common law, a retroactive overruling is required. I think
the answer is retroactive or not at all, but it may be helpful first to
try arguing the opposite.
The claim would be that a reworking of doctrine could lead the
judge to conclude that privacy is now of sufficient legal significance
for him to hold that Rochester's conduct constituted a tort, but that
Rochester was entitled, nevertheless, to rely upon the prior decision.
Accordingly, what Rochester did to Miss Roberson would not en-
title her to damages.
The difficulty with this position is similar to the difficulty in
Roberson itself: a judgment declining to award damages but grant-
ing an injunction. In the hypothetical Roberson case, to say that
the defendant was entitled to rely on the prior decision is the same
as saying that privacy is not of sufficient legal significance to make
the defendant's violation unlawful.
If the judge were to determine that the privacy principle required
overruling the prior decision, he would be saying that the law had
evolved and rendered that decision no longer good law. He would
not, however, be able to fix an exact point in time when the former
decision lost its operative effect.
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What he would be determining is that informed professional
opinion no longer considered the prior decision a stable precedent,
one that could be relied upon by the defendant. If this is correct,
it would seem arbitrary for a judge to write an opinion which
justifies overruling the earlier decision without also requiring the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff.8 7
14.
Unquestionably, the most extensive-and authoritative-examina-
tion of the prospective and retroactive application of decisional law
is to be found in the United States Reports. The Supreme Court has
been concerned with the question as it bears upon the application
of constitutional rules, most particularly rules dealing with the
rights of criminal defendants.
I should like to examine some of these cases, as if they were (to
the extent that it is possible) common law decisions. This enables
me to put aside questions of federalism and habeas corpus and to
test the assertions of the last several pages concerning the legitimacy
of prospective and retroactive overruling of prior decisions and the
relationship thereto of principles and policies. The cases to be con-
sidered, all involving the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment, are
Wolf v. Colorado,s8 Mapp v. Ohio,8 9 Linkletter v. Walker,90 Katz
v. United States,91 and Desist v. United States.
92
In Wolf, which was decided in 1949, state police, without a search
warrant and in a manner that would clearly have violated the Fourth
Amendment, seized the records of a physician. The records were
introduced into evidence in a criminal prosecution. The Court held
that the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a
free society. It is, therefore, implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause."9 3 The Court, however, declined to apply the federal
exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States94 to state courts; the
87. Cf. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59
(1969).
88. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
89. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
90. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
91. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
93. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
94. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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rule that the Fourth Amendment bars "the use of evidence secured
through illegal search and seizure." 95 Said the Court:
[T]he ways of enforcing such a basic right ["the security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police"] raise ques-
tions of a different order. How such arbitrary conduct should
be checked, what remedies against it should be afforded, the
means by which the right should be made effective are all ques-
tions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude
the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of
judgment on issues not susceptible to quantitative solution.96
Mapp, decided in 1961, overruled Wolf on this issue; indeed, in the
language of the dissent, it "suddenly [turned] its back on Wolf .... ,,97
It justified the exclusionary rule in state proceedings by an appeal
to both policy and principle; but whether the Court took policy or
principle to be the primary justification was unclear. It did sum-
marize its position as follows:
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important con-
stitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which
an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful
seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality
to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it." 98
Linkletter, a 1965 case, removed any doubt as to what the Court
considered to be the primary justification for the exclusionary rule.
Its opinion sounds in policy:
In short, just as other cases had found the exclusionary rule to
be a deterrent safeguard necessary to the enforcement of the
Amendment, . . .Mapp bottomed its rule on its necessity as a
"sanction upon which [the Fourth Amendment's] protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under .
Weeks" ....99
95. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 28.
96. Id.
97. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 656.
99. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 635 (1965).
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Linkletter, which was the Court's first serious adventure with the
prospective-retroactive problem, held only that Mapp did not apply
to state court convictions which had become final before Mapp was
decided. There is every reason to suppose, however, that had Link-
letter been decided after the Court had gained confidence in the
new doctrine, it would have held in Linkletter as it did with respect
to a related question, that Mapp be "given wholly prospective ap-
plication"'100 (except for Miss Mapp, herself).
Given the Court's justification for the exclusionary rule-a policy
to deter police-there is no reason for Mapp not to be wholly pro-
spective, if making it prospective is prudent. The issue is similar
to forfeiture in the cantaloupe case: there, concern was with the
subsequent behavior of buyers as a class; here, with police conduct.
Police conduct that is past cannot be changed. 101 The lesson will
not be driven home better by making Mapp retroactive.
1 2
In Katz v. United States, decided in 1967, the Court overruled
prior decisions and held electronic surveillance, unaccompanied by
a physical trespass, subject to the Fourth Amendment. There can
be no doubt that this "new" rule was justified by an extension of
the principle that made unreasonable searches, accomplished through
a trespass, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In a sense the
situation presented in Katz was similar to the hypothetical Roberson
case discussed earlier. The task for the Justices in Katz was rela-
tively easier, however, because the prior cases with which they had
to contend-Olmstead'0 3 and Goldman104-"[had] been so eroded by
. . subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enun-
ciated [could] no longer be regarded as controlling."'' 10 A reworking
100. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 246 (1969).
101. "The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will
not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
at 637.
102. Nor do I see anything improper in applying the exclusionary rule to Miss
Mapp. The Court would be making a reasonable classification in treating her dif-
ferently from others similarly situated if it were to upset her conviction, "for the
practical reason that case law is not likely to keep up with the needs of society if
the litigant who successfully champions a cause is left with only that distinction."
Willis v. Department of Cons. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 541, 264 A.2d 34, 37-38 (1970).
The Court's own explanation is in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and turns both
on the incentive to litigate and the case or controversy requirement of Article III.
See generally Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). Compare Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ,
and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965), with Schwartz,
Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI.
L. REv. 719 (1966).
103. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
104. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
105. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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of doctrine was the method by which the Justices were able to de-
termine how much weight to give the Fourth Amendment's principle
of privacy.
Desist, a 1969 decision, gave Katz (except for Mr. Katz) wholly
prospective application. That decision was wrong for the reasons
urged in the Roberson hypothetical. But, one might ask, is there
not a difference? It might be correct to say that the principle of
privacy used to justify the rule in Katz must have retroactive ap-
plication, but Desist is about the exclusionary rule, which, as we
have seen, is a rule justified by a policy. The Court in Desist was
not careful in its language when it said Katz was prospective only;
it neglected to separate the principle at stake in Katz from the policy
at issue in Desist. What it should have said was that Weeks and Mapp
do not apply to cases like Katz where the illegal search took place
before Katz was decided; that the reason for this is simply that the
police have already acted; that retroactively is not necessary to bring
the lesson home to them; and that the explanation given to justify
a prospective decision in Linkletter also justifies Desist.
The difficulty with such an explanation of Desist is that it as-
sumes that when a court is dealing with a policy there are no con-
straints imposed on it by principles. I have never meant so to con-
tend; in fact I emphatically reject such a proposition. While a court
has considerable discretion when working with policies, it may not
act arbitrarily. And that is just what the Court did in Desist. If
the Fourth Amendment's privacy principle extends to searches which
do not entail a trespass, so, too, does the exclusionary rule which
was the existing policy at the time of the search in Desist.
If the Court could show that the policy of deterrence would not
be effectuated by the exclusionary rule in situations where an illegal
search did not involve a trespass, the case would be different. Such
a demonstration, however, would have nothing to do with the retro-
active-prospective issue. Its logic would deny to Katz the rule of
Weeks and Mapp, both prospectively and retroactively. No such show-
ing can be made, although it may be that the exclusionary rule fails
across-the-board to serve the policy that purports to justify its ex-
istence. 06
106. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970). On the exclusionary rule and its justifi-
cation in terms of principle, in special situations, see pp. 270-72 infra.
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E. Principles and Policies in Statutory Interpretation
15.
In the insurance case discussed earlier no statute controlled the
outcome. The court, acting at common law, announced the rule that
a beneficiary who intentionally takes the life of the insured is barred
from recovering that money. It justified this rule by an appeal to
the principle that a wrongdoer should not profit from his wrong.
This principle should serve as justification for a similar rule, barring
inheritance by an heir who intentionally takes the life of his an-
cestor, even though the controlling statute of descent and distribu-
tion makes no exception for the cause of the ancestor's demise and
provides that one who occupies the family relationship of the heir
to his ancestor shall inherit. 0
7
There are two styles of explanations-with several variations-for
construing the statute of descent and distribution to reach the re-
sult of disinheriting the murdering heir. One begins by recognizing
that a court generally cannot determine whether the enacting legis-
lature canvassed the type of questions raised by the case, let alone
the concrete problems which the court must resolve and concludes
by asserting that, if the legislature had addressed the issue, it would
have decided that a wrongdoer should not profit from his wrong.
The second approach proceeds from the same initial premise about
the legislature, but then asserts that it is the court's own responsi-
bility to address the issue, and, accordingly, that the rule and its
justification should be the same as in the insurance case.
The difference between the two approaches is really a matter of
style and preference for one or the other a matter of taste. The court
is acting on its authority; also, the legislature probably would have
acknowledged the principle.
Suppose, however, that the assumption concerning the legislature,
which is shared by both approaches, proved unavailable. The descent
and distribution statute might address the cause of the ancestor's
demise and provide that: "No person finally adjudged guilty . . .
of murder in the first or second degree, shall inherit ... ."08 The
107. Cf. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). See generally Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HAv.
L. REv. 715 (1936).
108. 21 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Page 1968).
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heir, although intentionally having taken the life of his ancestor,
might have been convicted of manslaughter.
In such a case, it is clear that the legislature has canvassed the
general probleti. It has not, however, resolved the case, for it has
not, in terms, addressed the issue in the case. Nor is there any
way-absent an extraordinarily clear legislative history-of knowing
why the statute failed to address manslaughter or what the legislature
would have concluded had its enactment specifically dealt with that
issue.
Yet the fact that one is in substantial doubt as to what the legis-
lature would have concluded does not preclude a court from em-
ploying the first approach to statutory construction. In his Cardozo
Lecture on reading statutes, Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed:
In the end, language and external aids, each accorded the au-
thority deserved in the circumstances, must be weighed in the
balance of judicial judgment. Only if its premises are emptied of
their human variables, can the process of statutory construction
have the precision of a syllogism. We cannot avoid what Mr.
Justice Cardozo deemed inherent in the problems of construction,
making 'a choice between uncertainties. We must be content to
choose the lesser.' But to the careful and disinterested eye, the
scales will hardly escape appearing to tip slightly on the side of
a more probable meaning.10 9
The "lesser" uncertainty, the slight "tip," would, I should think,
to the "disinterested eye," favor a determination that legislative in-
tent required the heir to recover. Bearing in mind what Mr. Justice
Holmes has told us, namely, that a canon of statutory construction
is no more than an axiom of experience, 110 does not, in these cir-
cumstances, make it inappropriate-indeed, it makes it entirely ap-
propriate-for a court to appeal to the canon, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. In these circumstances, experience is the best way
to determine the lesser uncertainty.
Most students of the law, however, probably would agree that a
judgment holding for the heir in the supposed case was improper."'
Some might criticize the decision by denying that its interpretation
109. Frankfurter, The Reading of Statutes, in OF LAW AND MEN; PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSEs 45, 67-68 (P. Elman ed. 1956). The Cardozo quotation is from Burnet v.
Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288 (1933).
110. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
111. See HART& SACKS, supra note 28, at 106-10.
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of legislative intent is correct and arguing that the lesser uncertainty
bars the heir. I think that argument has force only if accompanied
by a heroic-and unfortunately fictitious-assumption about the rea-
sonableness and consistency of enacted law, an assumption that shifts,
or hides, responsibility as between court and legislature.
The court should assume responsibility by imposing on the legis-
lature a clear statement rule: to depart from an established principle,
the legislature must speak plainly. The exercise of judicial power
entailed in the application of such a rule is, of course, the exercise
of quasi-constitutional, judicial review. The court, in a mild way, is
resisting legislative purpose. It is interposing itself, in a noncoopera-
tive fashion, between the legislature and the people. Such an exer-
cise of power is, nevertheless, both common and legitimate. 112 Its
legitimacy stems from the nature of principles and the comparative
advantage of courts over legislatures in elucidating principles. Legis-
lative power to disregard principles exists in our form of government,
but it must be exercised without doubt.
The clear statement requirement is broader than the distinction
between principle and policy, for there are situations in which it
applies that are not illuminated by that distinction."13 But the clear
statement rule is not a requirement that we would feel at all com-
fortable about if it were imposed to restrain a legislature from dis-
respecting a policy.1 4 And this is so even if the policy might legiti-
mately serve as justification for a rule at common law. One need
hardly view the world through the lens of classical economics to
see all about him statutes that reject policies of efficiency and that
are interpreted according to their general purpose."15 The explana-
tion for this is simple enough: courts do not have a comparative
institutional advantage in designing the future." 6
112. Consider as an example Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
The Railway Labor Act empowers a union, designated by a majority of employees in
an appropriate unit, to represent all employees. In terms, it says nothing about the
nature of this representation. The Court has held, however, that the union is under
a duty to represent all employees fairly. Its reasoning in part was as follows:
It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to
act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exer-
cise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will
not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised
unless so expressed.
Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (federalism); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958) (delegation to administrative official).
114. Unless, of course, the policy had constitutional roots. See pp. 267-70 infra.
115. See, e.g., The Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1937), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
116. This section is a very preliminary inquiry into a vast subject.
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II. Constitutional Double Standards
F. Common Law Perspectives on Judicial Review
16.
To a considerable extent, lawyers see the Supreme Court as an
institution different from its common law counterparts. 1 7 The es-
sence of that difference is judicial review: the "sovereign preroga-
tive" that makes the "least dangerous branch of . . . American gov-
ernment . . . the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the
world has ever known." ' s The existence of judicial review-the power
of the Supreme Court in a case or controversy to declare govern-
mental action, and particularly congressional and state legislation,
unconstitutional-has, from time to time, placed a heavy burden of
explanation upon constitutional scholarship. Since the power first
was exercised by the Court in Chief Justice Marshall's 1803 opinion
in Marbury v. Madison,119 either the legitimacy or the scope of the
power has been an overarching problem in constitutional theory.
Legitimacy and scope are intertwined; intertwined too are explana-
tions.12
0
With varying degrees of persuasiveness, legitimacy is claimed by
an appeal to the text of the Constitution, particularly to Articles
III and VI. It is claimed too by an appeal to history, to the intention
of those men who made the Constitution. The purpose or function
of judicial review is perhaps the most important justification advanced
on behalf of the Court's power. 12 ' "The search must be for a func-
tion, . . ." says Alexander Bickel, "which differs from the legis-
lative and executive functions; which is peculiarly suited to the
capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed else-
117. See generally E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE QUEST FOR LAW (1962).
118. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 1 (1962).
119. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
120. See generally G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1-49 (8th ed. 1970).
121. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREmE
COURT (1969); A. BICKEL, supra note 118; C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JU-
DICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960); C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 67-98 (1969); M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT
(1964); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REV.
1 (1971); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political "Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Rostow, The Demo-
cratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952); Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
See also L. HAND, THE BIL. OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958).
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where if courts do not assume it .... ',122 Professor Bickel finds
that function by postulating "that government should serve not only
what we conceive from time to time to be our immediate material
needs but also certain enduring values."'123 And he sees in the Su-
preme Court and the institution of judicial review a means of pro-
tecting those "certain enduring values."
The text of the Constitution is also appealed to when the ques-
tion shifts from the legitimacy to the scope of judicial review. A domi-
nant figure is Mr. Justice Black and the language of the First Amend-
ment is perhaps the best known example. 124 Among Mr. Justice
Black, certain commentators, and other Justices there is substantial
disagreement as to how closely the text of the Constitution comes
to being a sufficient delineation of the scope of judicial review. As
to scope, history again is examined, and purpose or function is of
enormous importance. To quote Bickel once more: "[T]he framers
expected the Supreme Court to exercise a power of judicial review...
[but] they certainly had no specific intent relating to the nature
and range of the power and to the modalities of its exercise. This
is the more noteworthy since judicial review is an issue in the allo-
cation of competences
In Part I, I have argued in effect that the power of common law
courts to make law-"the range of [their] power and . . . the modali-
ties of its exercise"-is, to a very substantial extent, also "an issue
in the allocation of competences." My approach to the problem of
making common law has been to examine two types of justifications
for rules: policies and principles. It is the aim of Part II to suggest
that there may be utility in applying this type of analysis to the
making of constitutional law.
17.
Although the Supreme Court is special, it is nevertheless a court
of law. While it has vastly more power, it has many of the same
strengths and weaknesses as common law courts. It is not directly
responsible to the people; Justices are not elected. The Court is de-
signed to be unresponsive to the pressure and play of interest group
politics; Justices are insulated from such pressures. As with common
law courts, the Court is not well-suited to the development of policies.
Because it is insulated and because constitutional law as well as
common law can serve to filter out the passion and bias of the
122. A. BicKcL, supra note 118, at 24.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 865 (1960).
125. A. Bicaar., supra note 118, at 104 (emphasis added).
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moment, the Supreme Court is an institution well-positioned to trans-
late conventional morality into legal principle. The Court is more
powerful than a common law court when it acts as a constitutional
tribunal. The restraints, however, also are greater, for the power of
judicial review can be exercised only when the principle the Court
employs is related to constitutional text. Common law courts are not
so restricted.
One analogy to common law might seem made, and made neatly:
The scope of judicial review should be sharply restricted where the
primary justification for the exercise of judicial power is a consti-
tutional policy; it should be searching where the primary justifica-
tion is a principle.
Problems of judicial review, however, are complicated. In some
areas of constitutional law-those that least resemble common law-
analysis based on the distinction between principles and policies may
not be fruitful. It fails to take one very far where the issue is the
reach of federal power under the commerce clause, the war powers,
or executive privilege. Indeed, its utility is perhaps limited to the
critical area of individual rights against the state. And even here
there are difficulties. First, the Constitution sometimes imposes upon
the Supreme Court the task of searching review under a constitutional
provision which is justified primarily by a policy. Second, the task
of distinguishing principles from policies in the constitutional sphere
is even more difficult than it is at common law. 20
An example of the first complication is the protection of speech
in the First Amendment. While I have considerable sympathy with
attempts to cast freedom of expression in noninstrumental terms, to
see it as a principle, an end in itself, an aspect of "individual self-
fulfillment,"'12  the Court 28 and most commentators 12 9 place their
emphasis elsewhere.
30
126. It is also the case that, with the Constitution even more than with common
law, principle-policy analysis can give no more than a partial view. For one alternative
and promising approach see C. BLAcK, STRucTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
127. T. EMERSON, THE SYsrEhM OF FREEDOMf OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970). See, e.g., Scanlon,
A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 204 (1972). This aspect of
the First Amendment is to be found as well in the concept of liberty in the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See note 298 infra.
128. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
129. This is the case, moreover, irrespective of whether the commentators see con-
siderable or limited power in Congress to enact legislation raising serious First Amend-
ment questions. Compare Bork, supra note 121, with Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
130. This is not to say that all Justices see the First Amendment only as a policy.
Rather, it is to claim that most see the principle or principles involved as the secondary
justification and the policy as the primary justification. See Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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The speech clause of the First Amendment is seen as predominant-
ly instrumental: Its policy justification is nothing less than the func-
tioning and survival of American democracy. Holmes, dissenting in
Abrams v. United States, put it this way:
[W ]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 31
Abrams was a case involving political speech and the central con-
cept Holmes had in mind was free trade in political ideas. By "truth"
he probably meant "consumer" sovereignty. This can at times be a
worrisome notion, for Holmes is right: "Every idea is an incite-
ment."'132 There may be some room for reasonable disagreement as
to when and where consumer sovereignty should yield.' 33 There is also
room for doubt and disagreement as to the scope of protection re-
quired by the Amendment's policy. Should it reach the artistic, scien-
tific, and pornographic? Does it apply to nonverbal conduct?
There is, however, no room for doubt that the primary justification
for the constitutional protection of speech has been understood by
the Court to be an efficiency-type policy: The speech clause of the
First Amendment seeks to promote the dissemination of political
ideas. Accordingly, constitutional language apart, one might think
of the legislature as under a weak duty. One might expect it to ap-
proach a problem in terms of trade-offs. A free market in ideas, like
a free market in cantaloupes is not lightly to be disregarded. But it
is, after all, instrumental, a way of getting to a desirable position:
the successful functioning of the political process. In any given
situation, therefore, a prudential consideration of all the factors
may suggest a departure from the normal "free market" approach.
And the legislature, so long as it is acting reasonably, is apt to be
better suited than the Court to consider the relevant factors.
Suppose the language of the First Amendment were as follows:
131. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
132. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
133. See Bickel, The "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open" First Amendment: From
"Sullivan" to the Pentagon Papers, 54 COMMENTARY, Nov. 1972, at 60.
Vol. 83: 221, 1973
HeinOnline -- 83 Yale L.J. 268 1973-1974
Notes on Adjudication
"The proper functioning of the American political process is best
served by free trade in ideas; accordingly, Congress and the States
shall, when enacting legislation, give due respect to the effect of a
law upon the free expression of views and opinions . . . ." Under
such circumstances and given the Court's instrumental account of
freedom of expression, I submit that only if a legislature acted ir-
rationally or unreasonably (well accepted, although admittedly shift-
ing, standards) would judicial review permit the Court to hold a
law invalid as interfering with free expression. Such a constitutional
provision would require judicial review, but of a restricted nature. 3 4
The First Amendment, of course, is written differently: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " That
language, while hardly self-defining even with regard to plainly po-
litical speech, must charge the Court with a more searching scope
of review than the one encapsulated in a word like "rationality."
I would suggest, however, that the received justification of the
First Amendment has imposed limits on the way the Court can
approach questions raised under it. These limits are due to the fact
that "judicial review is an issue in the allocation of competences"
and they would not exist if the primary justification for the Amend-
ment were seen as a principle rather than a policy. Doctrines such
as vagueness 13  and overbreadth13 6 thus figure importantly in the law
of the First Amendment and statutory interpretation is everywhere in
evidence. 137 Each represents a judicial technique that is at least as
much procedural as substantive; each invites legislative reexamination
of the underlying issue. The message that these techniques carry
to the legislature is: "If you must, do it again; but do it with more
care, with fewer side effects, with responsibility duly and specifically
assumed."
These doctrines are employed where closely balanced questions
are presented and where the Court is comparatively at sea. It does not
have available-on its understanding-a principle and, therefore, has
134. Cf. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRAcY
217-21 (1960).
135. See, e.g., Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1967); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1963); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1962); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961). On vagueness see generally Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
137. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Fruit g: Veg. Pack. & Wareh. Local 750, 377 U.S. 58 (1964);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367.U.S. 740 (1961).
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no institutional advantage over the legislature. It has a general policy
to set off against a specific one. The specific policy applies to a
limited situation and represents a legislative judgment that in the
here and now the specific policy is more important. It is difficult
for the Court to second guess that kind of a cost-benefit analysis.
Yet because the Court views the First Amendment as instrumental, that
is what it must do if it takes on the question directly. 138 Accord-
ingly, the Court is apt to sidestep as best it can while recognizing
that the language of the Amendment does impose upon it a special
responsibility.139
18.
The second complication in principle-policyanalysis is the height-
ened difficulty in constitutional law of distinguishing principles from
policies. The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, as substantive limits on legislation, are the provisions I wish
to examine with this difficulty in mind. My hope is to justify what
has been called a double standard of judicial review; 140 I will argue
that Holmes probably was right in Lochner,141 that the holding in
Griswold v. Connecticut142 is correct, and that while the Court went too
far in Roe v. Wade,143 the majority did properly understand the
breadth of its obligation.
Before I embark on so ambitious an undertaking, however, I would
like to consider briefly a procedural due process problem that il-
lustrates the difficulty and the utility of a principle-policy analysis.
In Wolf v. Colorado44 the Court refused to apply the federal exclu-
sionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to a search and seizure (which
138. Cf. Bickel, supra note 133.
139. Take, as a related example of the utility of the principle-policy distinction, the
"penumbral" First Amendment question of whether political neutrality can constitu-
tionally be imposed upon a public employee. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973), where the Court gave a substantive
and affirmative answer. The issue in part is whether such an imposition violates the
employee's right of free association. Surprisingly, we know little about that right. Is
it mainly instrumental, as Tocqueville argued, "a necessary guarantee against the
tyranny of the majority"? A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 177 (J. Maynard
& M. Lerner eds. 1966). If it is, then its reach must be judged in terms of the goal
it seeks to serve. And that goal-preventing the tyranny of the majority-may well be
furthered by the political neutrality of public employees rather than by their active
involvement in the political process. If, on the other hand, the right of free association
were seen as desirable in itself (and quite apart from whether it furthers a separate
societal goal), the power of Congress to restrict the political activities of federal em-
ployees should, indeed, be meager.
140. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note 120, at 838.
141. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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did not involve physical assault upon an individual) found illegal
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court, saw the exclusionary rule as justified by a policy of
deterring police behavior. He did not see it embedded within "the
concept of ordered liberty," a phrase (there were others) that in
1949 set forth the scope of judicial review of state criminal pro-
ceedings under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rochin v. California145 was decided three years later, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter again writing for the Court. Rochin too involved a state
criminal prosecution; the principal evidence against the defendant
also had been obtained illegally; the standard of review remained
"the concept of ordered liberty." Rochin's conviction, however, was
upset. And the facts made the difference: The police had forcibly
entered Rochin's apartment in search of narcotics and saw some
capsules on a nightstand. When Rochin gulped them down, the police
took him to a hospital and, without his permission, had a doctor
pump Rochin's stomach, the contents of which were found to in-
clude morphine capsules.'
4
Unless one insists upon converting every principle into an untest-
able policy, Rochin, when viewed in light of Wolf, must be seen as
announcing a rule justified at least primarily by a principle. As in
the insurance case with which this paper began, one could talk in-
strumentally. Various policies are available: Perhaps the rule is de-
signed to deter physical assault by the police or perhaps it aims,
through a process of socialization, to affect attitudes and thereby in-
fluence behavior. Yet surely Rochin is correct even if it has no effect
on the behavior of anyone. "This is conduct," said Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, "that shocks the conscience." And he went on;
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is
heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible
evidence is obtained. This was not true even before the series
of recent cases enforced the constitutional principle that the
States may not base convictions upon confessions, however much
verified, obtained by coercion. These decisions are not arbitrary
exceptions to the comprehensive rights of States to fashion their
own rules of evidence for criminal trials. They are not sports in
our constitutional law but applications of a general principle.
They are only instances of the general requirement that States
in their prosecutions respect certain decencies of civilized con-
145. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
146. Id. at 166.
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duct. Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle,
precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of con-
duct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought
about by methods that offend "a sense of justice." 147
G. Substantive Due Process: Background
19.
Close scrutiny of economic regulation under the due process
clauses was out of favor when the Court decided the Lincoln Federal
Labor Union case in 1949.148 The case involved state "right to work"
laws and among the unsuccessful constitutional challenges raised was
a liberty of contract, due process contention: "the [right to work]
laws are specifically designed," said the appellants, "to deprive all
persons . . . of 'liberty' (1) to refuse to hire or retain any person in
employment because he is or is not a union member, and (2) to
make a contract or agreement to engage in such employment dis-
crimination against union or non-union members."' 49 On his way
to rejecting this contention, Mr. Justice Black, in the opinion of
the Court, reviewed the past:
In 1907 this Court in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
considered the federal law which prohibited discrimination
against union workers. Adair, an agent of the Louisville & Nash-
ville Railroad Company, had been indicted and convicted for
having discharged Coppage, an employee of the railroad, because
Coppage was a member of the Order of Locomotive Firemen.
This Court there held, over the dissents of Justices McKenna
and Holmes, that the railroad, because of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, had a constitutional right to discrim-
inate against union members and could therefore do so through
use of yellow dog contracts. The chief reliance for this holding
was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, which had invalidated a
New York law prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries.
This Court had found support for its Lochner holding in what
had been said in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, a case on
which appellants here strongly rely. There were strong dissents
in the Adair and Lochner cases.
In 1914 this Court reaffirmed the principles of the Adair case
in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, again over strong dissents, and
147. Id. at 172-73. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 433, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
148. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
149. Id. at 533.
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held that a Kansas statute outlawing yellow dog contracts denied
employers and employees a liberty to fix terms of employment.
For this reason the law was held invalid under the due process
clause.
The A llgeyer-Lochner-A dair-Coppage constitutional doctrine
was for some years followed by this Court. It was used to strike
down laws fixing minimum wages and maximum hours in em-
ployment, laws fixing prices, and laws regulating business ac-
tivities. . . . And the same constitutional philosophy was faith-
fully adhered to in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 . . . [where]
this Court with four justices dissenting struck down a state law
absolutely prohibiting maintenance of private employment agen-
cies. The majority found that such businesses were highly bene-
ficial to the public and upon this conclusion held that the state
was without power to proscribe them ...
This Court beginning at least as early as 1934 ... has steadily
rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-
Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned
closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states
have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious
practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so
long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal con-
stitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law. . . . Under
this constitutional doctrine the due process clause is no longer
to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legis-
latures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress
business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive
to the public welfare. I 50
Subsequent cases suggest that judicial review of economic legislation
under the due process clauses is now de minimis, that for good or
ill the Court now finds itself in a doctrinal strait jacket.15 1
20.
The development of procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment-and particularly its employment to control the states'
administration of criminal justice-is a very different story, one that
must be discussed because of the difficulty, at the margin, of dis-
tinguishing substance from procedure and for the light procedural
due process casts upon the double standard problem before us. Much
of the judicial and extrajudicial debate has focused upon the incor-
150. Id. at 534-37.
151. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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poration of some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 152
Palko v. Connecticut'53 (decided when the Court was contracting
the scope of its review of economic legislation) rejected a contention
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated Amendments I-VIII.
The defendant argued that Connecticut had placed him twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, that this would have been unconsti-
tutional under the Fifth Amendment had it been attempted by the
national government, and that Connecticut had thus deprived him
of due process of law. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Cardozo
flatly rejected the incorporation argument and held that what Con-
necticut had done was not inconsistent with "the concept of ordered
liberty." Although Mr. Justice Black was on the Court and joined the
Palko majority, his was to become the most insistent voice for incor-
poration. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were the dominant spokes-
men for the application to the states of procedural due process through
the elaboration of "the concept of ordered liberty."'
15 4
Looking back, the debate seems overly sharp and its resolution (as
a general matter, in contradistinction to any particular holding), not
unexpected. Contemporary technology, a population moving frequent-
ly across state lines, and the expanding role of the federal govern-
ment in law enforcement have made America too much one country
for considerations of federalism to sustain at a constitutional level
any dramatic difference between the procedural safeguards afforded
criminal defendants in federal and state proceedings. And increas-
ingly the constitutional standards developed for the nation under
the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'r In one sense then,
the incorporationists or partial incorporationists have won. 150 Yet,
152. The remainder of the debate-its "substantive" aspect-has concerned the in-
terpretation of the first eight Amendments and particularly the increased protection
afforded the individual under some portions of the Bill of Rights by the Warren
Court. See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
153. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
154. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring);
id. at 171 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); id. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Henkin, Selective
Incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Kadish, Method-
ology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J.
319 (1957).
155. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
156. Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic con-
stitutional rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the cir-
cumstances do not disclose a denial of "fundamental fairness." Once it is decided
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if one sees "the concept of ordered liberty" as contextual, as bound
up with the expectations that are generated in this country during
this phase of its economic, social, and political history, one would
expect to find "ordered liberty" increasingly elaborated by reference
to the procedural standards the Bill of Rights imposes on the central
government. 15
7
Mr. Justice Black, however, did not admit this. Moreover, it seems
fair to say that for him, and perhaps others, a major benefit of in-
corporation (and perhaps a reason for his advocacy of it) was that
incorporation would separate judicial review of the states' adminis-
tration of criminal justice from judicial review of the states' regula-
tion of economic affairs. And it would anchor the former in a sub-
stantially more extensive constitutional text and, in his view, subject
it to substantially greater judicial scrutiny.
Black's distaste for economic due process (and for all substantive
due process) 0 8 was of a piece with his distaste for the procedural
due process approach-symbolized by Palko-that undertook to test
constitutionality with "the concept of ordered liberty." If this for-
mula, "based on natural justice, or others which mean the same
thing," Black said in dissent, is "to prevail, [it] require[s] judges to
determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own
appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary." This is not for a
court. "The power to make such decisions is of course that of a
legislative body."' 1 9
While the text of the Bill of Rights does give direction to the
Court's inquiry in the area of procedural due process (and, as I have
suggested, it would be a major source of constitutional law vis-a-vis
the states without incorporation), the text does not begin to resolve
the scope of judicial review question.10 Constitutional text does,
however, separate procedural due process analytically from questions
of judicial review and double standards in the area of substantive
due process.
that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is "fundamental to the American scheme
of justice" . . . the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and
federal Governments.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
157. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
158. See p. 290 infra.
159. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). The
burden of these notes-in part at least-is to disprove this point of view, to deny its
validity in both constitutional and common law adjudication.
160. The substantive aspect of procedural due process would, in my judgment, profit
from a principle-policy analysis. See discussion of Wolf and Rochin at pp. 270-72
supra. Consider the approach with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination.
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21.
Separated too by constitutional text from judicial review in the
substantive due process area are questions of review under the First
Amendment. Yet the double standard question often seems to focus
mainly on the justification for a different scope of review in eco-
nomic due process cases, on the one hand, and free speech cases on
the other. While it may be that the marked difference in the
modern Court's approach to speech and economic liberty cannot be
borne by constitutional text, one would surely intuit from the lan-
guage of the Constitution a difference in the scope of review and,
accordingly, a double standard of some sort.101
History is at least partially responsible for juxtaposing economic
due process and the First Amendment. First, the "absorption" of the
First Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth0 2
coincided with the heyday of the "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage
constitutional doctrine." And absorption was justified by an appeal
to the fundamental nature of speech rather than to the language of
the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Brandeis, for example, concurring
in Whitney v. California, said:
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me
persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well
as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights com-
prised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Con-
stitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech,
the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fun-
damental rights.0 3
Second, speech remained fundamental as other "fundamental rights
comprised within the term liberty" lost their "fundamentalness" with
the demise of economic due process. Indeed, speech seemed to gain
status in the rhetoric of the Court.0 4
161. See C. BLACK, supra note 134.
162. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
163. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
164. Consider Cardozo's words in Palko:
We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we pass to the
privileges and immunities that have been taken over from the earlier articles of
the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a
process of absorption . . . . This is true . . . of freedom of thought and speech.
Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition,
of nearly every other form of freedom.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). Another reason for the attention
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Yet, as with procedural due process and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, so with speech and the Fourteenth Amendment: Absorption
seems inevitable even without resort to the claim that speech is some-
how intrinsically more important than economic liberty, that speech
is in a "preferred position." 165 In contrast to economic liberty, the
Constitution places a direct restraint on Congress where speech is
at issue. In contemporary America a radically different standard for
state legislatures would impose a burden on our federalism it could
not endure. In this sense the absorption of the First Amendment
and the selective incorporation of federal procedural due process
are the other side of the commerce clause coin: The expansion of
federal power makes the Bill of Rights a source of law that the
Court in elaborating the Fourteenth Amendment could not long
ignore.106
22.
No appeal, however, to the language of the Constitution (either
directly or through incorporation, absorption, or analogy) is available
to explain a different scope of review under the due process clauses
themselves of legislation restricting personal or civil as distinguished
from economic liberties.10 7 The "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage
constitutional doctrine" did not involve such a distinction. While
the bulk of decisions from that period were concerned with economic
legislation, searching review of laws restricting personal liberties was
paid to a different standard of review in First Amendment and substantive due
process cases is that the "new equal protection," see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and the "new due process," see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and pp. 285-311 infra, developed later.
165. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
166. This is a common way in which the general law grows. Direct analogies exist
in nonconstitutional and quasi-constitutional law. When Congress enacted the Railway
Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act, it gave a form of legislative power
to the unions. It imposed no explicit restraints, however, on the unions' exercise of
power. The Court found such restraints implicit in the grant of power, and the re-
straints tracked (by analogy) the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
The growth of common law protection of members in private associations, par-
ticularly labor unions, is another example. Procedural and substantive safeguards for
union members were developed by analogy to the protection of the citizen from over-
reaching by the state. Among the substantive rights most frequently honored (that
is to say, judicially established) was the right of free speech. See Summers, The Law
of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 199 (1960).
A further example is the application of the Uniform Commercial Code to transac-
tions that are not, in terms, within the Code. See, e.g., United States v. Wegematic
Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
167. The same is true of the "old" and the "new" equal protection. The literature
is vast. See generally G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note 120, at 983-1048. Compare
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 196S Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969), with Winter, Poverty, Economic
Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41.
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also undertaken. In Meyer v. Nebraska the Court upset a statute
drastically restricting the teaching of "any subject to any person in
any language other than the English language." "Plaintiff in error,"
said the Court, "taught [German] in school as part of his occupation.
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so
to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment. 16s In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Court held an Oregon statute mandating attendance at public school
-as opposed to any other kind-unconstitutional under the due
process clause. Plaintiffs were granted "protection against arbitrary
and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent
destruction of their business and property."' 09 For "patrons" one
may read parents or guardians, and of their interest the Court said:
"The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."'170
With the Court's abandonment of any serious review of economic
legislation, cases like Meyer and Pierce must also be abandoned or
a new theoretical justification found.17' If abandonment once might
have been possible, it no longer is. Indeed, the demand for a new
justification, and thus for a double standard in the application of
substantive due process, is now a first order task of constitutional
theory.
In 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 72 held that state's
anti-contraceptive statute unconstitutional. A bewildering mishmash
of theories was advanced; they add up to substantive due process. In
1973 the Court struck down the Texas and Georgia abortion stat-
utes; 17 3 it did so-and indicated it was doing so-under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
174
Explanations for a double standard go back at least to Mr. Justice
Stone's Carolene Products footnote in 1938. Stone suggested that the
contraction of judicial review in the economic area did not neces-
sarily entail a similarly reduced scope of review (1) where "legis-
lation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
168. 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
169. 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925).
170. Id. at 535.
171. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court sees Meyer and
Pierce as First and Fourteenth Amendment cases. Id. at 482.
172. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
173. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
(Georgia).
174. 410 U.S. at 153.
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Constitution such as those of the first ten Amendments," (2) where
"legislation . . . restricts those political processes which can ordi-
narily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,"
e.g., "right to vote," "dissemination of information," "political or-
ganizations," "peaceable assembly", or (3) where legislation is "di-
rected at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minorities."
And with respect to (3), Stone asked "whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."'175
Whatever may be said of Stone's footnote,176 nothing in it ex-
plains the scope of judicial review in Griswold or in Roe. More-
over, Stone's third category, qualified as it is to include any political
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities, seems to abandon
the distinction between personal and economic liberty, 177 and this
at a time when, and in a case where, the Court was drastically re-
ducing its role in the economic sphere.
In addition to Stone's attempt, there are at least two other gen-
eral lines of argument made for the distinction between judicial
treatment of economic and personal liberties, both of which may
mistakenly be thought related to principle-policy analysis.
First, it may be argued that personal liberties are more important,
and in that sense more fundamental, than economic liberties. In the
hands of a good philosopher this can be a sophisticated and seduc-
tive argument. It often is, as Professor Robert McCloskey has ob-
served, an elitist argument-it has "the smell of the lamp about it."' 178
Of course, this does not make it bad philosophy and it may even be
that one can develop a theory of constitutional law based upon a
philosophical system that ranks values in terms of their essentiality.
I do not think this has yet been done and it should be made clear
that it is an enterprise sharply different from the principle-policy
distinction that I have been attempting. I do not entertain the no-
tion that principles are in any way more important or fundamental
or of an intrinsically higher value than policies. I think only that the
175. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
176. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note 120, at 1052-56.
177. For example, a -professional group may be a discrete and insular minority
subject to political prejudice, as the opticians in Oklahoma discovered. See Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
178. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. RFv. 34, 46.
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two are different types of justifications for legal rules, with resulting
institutional implications stemming from the nature of American
democracy.
Moreover, the relationship I envision between principles and mo-
rality is a relationship between legal principles and conventional
morality. Conventional morality is not necessarily the best morality
and makes no claim to be, as does, and perhaps is, the great phi-
losopher's. Each generation's best influences the conventional. We
may all think somewhat differently about some aspects of morality,
for example, after Rawls. 7 9 But the impact of professional philosoph-
ical thought on common morality is slow and philosophical posi-
tions undergo a life-change, having to do with absorption and as-
similation and interaction with the best of the past and with the
conditions of society.
Second, McCloskey has suggested that "[p]erhaps the decision to
leave economic rights to the tender mercy of the legislative power
is based on the idea that the Supreme Court is peculiarly ill-equipped
to deal with this subject."' 80 But, as developed by McCloskey, this is
a trivial notion, a straw man to be knocked over, for he explains the
point in terms of the complexity or difficulty of the underlying issue,
and, as so told, he rightly concludes that economic regulation on the
average is intrinsically no more difficult to review than other kinds
of legislation. In hard cases, judicial review is hard work, so too-
it might be added-is a great deal of what judges do at common law.
McCloskey's suggestion, however, can be cleansed of its triviality:
"Judicial review is an issue in the allocation of competences" and
principle-policy distinctions are one way of getting at comparative
institutional advantage. The problem is how to use that tool in de-
termining the extent to which a double standard of review is jus-
tified. The place to begin is with an old villain, Lochner v. New
York.'s8
H. Substantive Due Process: Economic Regulation
23.
Lochner was an early case in the now discredited line that Mr.
Justice Black referred to as the "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage
constitutional doctrine." 18 2 The case raised the validity, under the
179. J. R Aws, supra note 57.
180. McCloskey, supra note 178, at 51.
181. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
182. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
535 (1949).
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Fourteenth Amendment, of a New York statute fixing maximum
working hours for bakery employees.1 13
The three opinions (one for the Court, holding the statute uncon-
stitutional, and two dissents) are crisp by contemporary standards.
Nor thereby do they either gain or lose persuasiveness. Mr. Justice
Peckham-long on clarity, short on reasons-wrote for five. First, the
"general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part
of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . . Under that provision no state can deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this
amendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the right."'u
4
Second, such circumstances, it would seem, include valid state legis-
lation, that is, legislation falling within the rubric of police powers.
"Those powers, broadly stated ... relate to the safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the public."'8 5 Third, "[v]iewed in the light
of a purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the question
of health . . .[the New York] law . . .involves neither the safety, the
morals nor the welfare of the public, and ... the interest of the public
is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act."' 86 Fourth, while
the law may purport to be a health measure, it is not. "We think that
there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker, in and of
itself, is not an unhealthy one to that degree which would authorize
the legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and with the
right of free contract on the part of the individual, either as em-
ployer or employee."' 8 7 Fifth, other arguments concerning health
are frivolous. "Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting
the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn
their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of
the individual . "188 Accordingly, the statute was held uncon-
stitutional. 89
183. 198 U.S. at 46 n.l.
184. Id. at 53.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 57.
187. Id. at 59.
188. Id. at 61.
189. The contemporary formulation of the 1905 holding might be that there is an
insufficiently compelling state interest to justify a legislative intrusion into an area
of fundamental individual liberty (privacy?). For health to be "compelling," it must
be "clearly" involved. Id. at 61.
The elder Harlan (who was to write for the Court in Adair) dissented for himself
and Justices White and Day. Accepting the majority's general framework, he sounded
a note of judicial restraint.
[In determining the question of power to interfere with liberty of contract, the
court may inquire whether the means devised by the State are germane to an end
which may be lawfully accomplished and have a real or substantial relation to the
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Holmes dissented in what has become one of his famous opinions.
However, whether his opinion should be read as supporting a sharply
limited scope of judicial review in all substantive due process cases
-and thus a single standard-is difficult to say, for Holmes dissented
in Meyer v. Nebraska,190 but joined the Court in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.191
This much we do know: Holmes saw Lochner as "decided upon an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not enter-
tain."'' 9 2 He made it clear that he did not view the judicial function
in constitutional adjudication as having to come to terms with the
wisdom or folly of an economic theory reflected in a statute duly en.
acted by a state legislature. A constitution, he said, "is not intended
to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the ac-
cident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Con-
stitution of the United States."' 93
Holmes's characterization of the Court's opinion as resting upon
the economic beliefs of a majority of the Justices fits a contemporary
view of the issue raised in the Lochner case. Today, most of us would
see the New York statute as a protective labor law responsive to a
legislative loss of confidence in the private contract regime. Oppo-
sition to the statute accordingly is likely to be viewed as a display
of confidence in the private contract and the underlying economic
order with which it is associated; opposition by the Court would
thus seem to raise private contract and laissez faire economics to
the level of constitutional dogma.' 94
protection of health, as involved in the daily work of the persons, male and female,
engaged in bakery and confectionery establishments. But when this inquiry is en-
tered upon I find it impossible, in view of common experience, to say that there
is here no real or substantial relation between the means employed by the State
and the end sought to be accomplished by its legislation. . ... Nor can I say that
the statute has no appropriate or direct connection with that protection to health
which each State owes to her citizens, . . . or that it is not promotive of the health
of the employees in question, . . or that the regulation prescribed by the State is
utterly unreasonable and extravagant or wholly arbitrary .... Still less can I say
that the statute is, beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured
by the fundamental law.
Id. at 69-70.
190. 262 U.S. 390, 412 (1923).
191. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
192. 198 U.S. at 75.
193. Id. at 75-76.
194. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 46, at 7-46.
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Yet Lochner purported to see the issue as one of personal liberty.
This is not necessarily inconsistent with Holmes's characterization of
the Court's approach or, indeed, of a present-day analysis, if one
equates laissez faire economics with personal liberty. Many did and
some do. But, as Holmes said, the economic theory was widely ques-
tioned at the time of Lochner and it seems fair to add that it was
questioned by some because it was viewed as intruding upon per-
sonal liberty. Time has changed some to many. 195
24.
An examination of Lochner in principle-policy terms would ask
whether the due process clause should afford any protection to liberty
to contract and, if so, why. Suppose a statute were enacted abolish-
ing private contract and substituting in its place a State Board of
Exchange. All transactions formerly made by contract now must be
made through the Board, which is given power to set prices and con-
ditions of performance and to reject transactions that are not within
the public interest.'96
In attacking the constitutionality of this law one would not want
to stress the instrumental, namely, that the statute may be grossly
inefficient. It is difficult to see what credentials the Court has en-
titling it to second-guess the policy decision of the legislature on
such a question. If substantive due process does impose some obli-
gation on the Court to address this aspect of the legislation, it must
be limited indeed. Yet assuming that the statute either will have a
beneficial effect on the allocation of goods and services or, more
properly, that that is not an issue of serious judicial concern, might
an objection to the constitutionality of the statute be mounted in
terms of personal liberty? Freedom to enter into transactions is a
component of personal liberty that does have a connection with con-
ventional morality. It is valued by the individual for itself, as a
means, and apart from ends.
This kind of personal liberty counts vastly less as a moral (and
therefore, legal) principle than it used to. Principles are contextual
and part of context is effect.'97 We have become increasingly aware
of the effects-the externalities-attendant upon private ordering
through contract. Indeed, some insist, and they may be at least par-
195. Id.
196. Put to one side any commerce clause difficulties or problems with the dele-
gation doctrine.
197. See pp. 224-25 supra.
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tially correct, that this awareness has become an obsession, leading
to the establishment of unwise policies and to the advocacy of new
policies that could be disastrous.198 Be that as it may, the connection
between free trade and personal freedom has been undermined in
the attitudes and convictions of the bulk of Americans. Moral sup-
port for laissez faire economics is no longer prominently displayed
in the atlas of national values.
If one is inclined, moreover, to view property as a concept dif-
ferent from contract, he will find that property too has undergone
a time-life change. The uses to which ownership has been put-the
property-power relationship' 99-and the diffusion of ownership via
the corporation, have dramatically eroded the prominence of proper-
ty's place in conventional morality. But it too has a long half-life. I
would suppose that a statute granting compensation, but outlawing
the ownership of all private homes, raises serious constitutional ques-
tions under the due process clause. One can believe in the desirable
effects of such a statute. One can also believe that home ownership
is viewed in the morality of the nation as an extension of the in-
dividual's personality and, at this time, arguably beyond the reach
of legislation.
My point is not that either hypothetical statute would be uncon-
stitutional. That is a question that cannot be answered in the ab-
stract. My point is that each case should be viewed as presenting a
serious substantive due process question, that because judicial re-
view is, to a considerable extent, "an issue in the allocation of com-
petences," review should be searching. The wisdom of the legisla-
tion in instrumental terms is to be assumed, or virtually assumed.
Serious review, however, should be given to the claim of personal
liberty that properly may be raised with respect to each statute. The
Court's task is to ascertain the weight of the principle in conven-
tional morality and to convert the moral principle into a legal one
by connecting it with the body of constitutional law.
The law in this area (economic liberty) has gone too far in cas-
ually rejecting due process. The modem Court insists upon collapsing
the principle that is at stake into the policy which is properly seen
as legislatively settled. While the principle generally is weak and
insufficient to justify a declaration of unconstitutionality, that is no
198. The view is not limited to those who are unsympathetic to substantial changes
in the American economy. See, e.g., P. PASSELL & L. Ross, THE RETREAT FROM RicHus
(1973).
199. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 368 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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excuse for the Court's frequent refusal to address the issue.200 In this
sense the modern Court is the mirror image of the Lochner ma-
jority, which converted every policy into an overblown principle.
A double standard of judicial review is justified, but the distinc-
tion is not to be drawn between economic regulation, as such, and
personal liberty, as such, but between policies and principles. The
old economic due process cases were probably wrong in result when
decided and clearly would be wrong if so decided today. They are
also wrong in method. The bulk of the contemporary cases are also
wrong in method, but generally correct in result, for today economic
freedom is a principle of relatively insubstantial weight.
It is not, however, a principle of relatively insubstantial weight
because it is fundamentally less important than other principles. Con-
ventional morality today simply does not attach much weight to it.
And that is what should count in constitutional adjudication, not the
relative merits of any one school of philosophy or economics. The
Fourteenth Amendment, as Holmes has said, does "not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Nor does it enact Mr. John Rawls's
A Theory of Justice.20 1 What it does enact, as the following dis-
cussion of contraception and abortion may further show, is an ap-
proach to institutional differentiation that is closely related to the
common law's approach: one derived from the nature of American
democracy.
I. Substantive Due Process: Contraception
25.
If prior to 1965 a state were to have enacted a statute, making
plain in the preamble that a reduction in population growth was its
goal and adducing reasons for such a policy relating to the state's
environment and its economy, there would be little room, under the
approach I have been urging, for the Court to question the validity
of the statute's purpose. Nor, I take it, would there have been under
any other then contemporary approach to due process. If, however,
the statute's means of achieving the goal were to make it a crime
200. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). It is interesting to observe that in statutory interpretation
economic due process is alive and well. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203,
217-26 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
201. This is not to say that J. Rmwzs, supra note 57, is irrelevant to a proper in-
terpretation of substantive due process. See p. 280 supra.
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for married persons to have sexual intercourse "between the tenth
and twentieth day after the onset of the female partner's last men-
strual period," that would, under principle-policy analysis, raise a
serious constitutional question, a question of personal liberty under
the due process clause. The Court would have to ask itself whether
such a restriction offended conventional moral standards and, if-as
it seems to me is clearly the case-it did, whether constitutional doc-
trine could be interpreted to sustain or invalidate the legislation.
Invalidation seems to me proper based on some of the reasoning in
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe v. Ullman.202
Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v. Connecticut,20 3 on the merits, and
apart from the justiciability questions on which Poe was decided, are
more complicated cases. On the one hand, the purpose of the Con-
necticut statute was to regulate morals; on the other, the means
established to effectuate that purpose were less clearly offensive to
conventional morality. The statute provided that:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instru-
ment for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.20 4
The statute, which applied to married persons, had as its major pur-
pose effectuating either the state's opposition to "all forms of promis-
cuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extra
marital . . .,,205 or the state's opposition to birth control based on
a conclusion that contraception was immoral.
206
Unlike the hypothetical statute, which in purpose is only tangen-
tially related to moral considerations, the Connecticut statute pur-
ported to be a regulation of moral conduct. Means and ends here
raise different aspects of what would have to be conceptualized as
the regulation of morality. Accordingly, if I am right about the
distribution of institutional competence between legislature and
Court, the constitutionality of the statute's purpose as well as the
means chosen to achieve that purpose should be subject to search-
ing judicial review.
This conclusion most emphatically does not mean that conven-
tional morality would be found to disapprove of the state's opposi-
202. 867 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
203. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
204. Id. at 480.
205. Id. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
20G. Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tion to "all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships" or
that, even if it did, constitutional law could be reworked to permit
a determination of unconstitutionality on this ground, at this time.
It does mean, however, that the Court should not in the future dis-
pose of statutes restricting the sexual activities of consenting adults
by assuming that the purpose of the statute is permissible, that the
judicial function is limited to examining its means.
It is now appropriate to state what has been assumed throughout
(and was observed earlier),20 7 namely, that the existence of legisla-
tion counts as evidence of conventional morality. It counts, as does
the entire corpus juris. But it is far from conclusive: There is the
time elapsed since enactment (the Connecticut statute dated from
1879), the unreliability of drawing conclusions from subsequent legis-
lative inaction, and, most importantly, the nature of the legislature
which is responsive to shifting power configurations in a community,
but not advantageously positioned to find shifting conventional mo-
rality in the community.
26.
While the defendants in the Griswold case were convicted under
a general aiding and abetting statute for giving married persons birth
control advice, the Court saw the case as involving the constitu-
tionality of the anti-contraceptive statute: The issue addressed was
whether it was constitutional for a state to make it a crime for a
married couple to use a contraceptive device.
The opinion of the Court was concerned with justifying its prior
rejections of economic due process, finding a way of preserving the
learning of such cases As Meyer and Pierce, and holding the Con-
necticut statute unconstitutional, while at the same time avoiding
the charge that it was fashioning constitutional law out of the Jus-
tices' personal preferences. This, the Court, in an opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas, attempted to do by seeming to eschew the propo-
sition that due process had any content' independent of other con-
stitutional provisions (although a majority of the Justices explicitly
stated that it did), resting Pierce and Meyer on the absorption of
the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, and holding that Connec-
ticut had violated the constitutional "notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship."20 s
The Constitution, of course, does not, in terms, grant a right to
207. See pp. 248-49 supra.
208. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486.
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(or even a right of) privacy and, given the concerns of the Court,
it seems strange that it would undertake so dramatically to disas-
sociate itself from the text it was construing. The Court's reasoning
was as follows: (1) "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance."2- 9 (The Court fails to explain how
substantive content can be given to such a formulation unless judges
engage in a process of analysis closely related to determining the
content of due process.) (2) "Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one . . . .The Third Amendment in its pro-
hibition against the quartering of soldiers . . is another .. . .The
Fourth Amendment . . . [and the] Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause" are still others.210 (3) Moreover, the Court
quoted, but left to the reader's imagination, the relevance of the
Ninth Amendment.2 11 (4) "The present case . . .concerns a rela-
tionship lying within the zone of privacy created by [these] several
fundamental constitutional guarantees."21 2 And (5) the Connecticut
statute sweeps "unnecessarily broadly ."213 in its regulation of pri-
vacy within the marriage relationship.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Brennan, wrote a concurring opinion accepting the proposition that
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment "protects those personal rights
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the
Bill of Rights." Justice Goldberg also unwrapped the Ninth Amend-
ment to support this view: "The language and history of [that]
Amendment reveal that the framers of the Constitution believed that
there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmen-
tal infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights spe-
cifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."
214
In Poe v. Ullman, Mr. Justice Harlan had urged the unconstitu-
tionality of the Connecticut statute. In Griswold, he disassociated
himself from the Court's opinion, primarily, it would seem, because
of its assumption that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the en-
actment is found to violate some rights assured by the letter or
209. Id. at 484.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 485.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 486, 488.
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penumbra of the Bill of Rights."2 15 Harlan's approach to substan-
tive due process was one with his approach to procedural due process
and over the years his had been a strong and insistent voice for the
Palko approach: "[T]he proper constitutional inquiry in this case
is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause
• . . because the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.' "16
Harlan had worked with admirable craftsmanship in Poe v. Ullman
to demonstrate why the Connecticut statute failed under the Palko
test, why it was appropriate to subject it to "strict scrutiny," rather
than to a test "going merely to the plausibility of its underlying ra-
tionale"2 17 (this test, we may assume, Harlan would apply in a case
like Lochner). His opinion speaks of a right to marital privacy as
an aspect of liberty within the due process clause. Fundamental im-
portance is given to the family, the home as its seat, and the cen-
trality of the relationship between husband and wife to family and
home. He draws heavily, in his opinion, upon the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, finding that its interpretation "amply shows
that the Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all
unreasonable intrusions of whatever character." 218 And he reasons
that it is appropriate to extend constitutional protection to "the life
which characteristically has its place in the home." 2 19 "Pierce and
Meyer ... as was said in Prince v. Massachusetts . . . 'have respected
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.' . . .
Of this whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult to imagine
what is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's
marital relations. -2 2 0 And that, ultimately, is Harlan's problem with
the Connecticut law:
Precisely what is involved here is this: the State is asserting
the right to enforce its moral judgment by intruding upon the
most intimate details of the marital relation with the full power
of the criminal law. Potentially, this could allow the deployment
of all the incidental machinery of the criminal law, arrests,
searches and seizures; inevitably, it must mean at the very least
the lodging of criminal charges, a public trial, and testimony
as to the corpus delicti. Nor could any imaginable elaboration
of presumptions, testimonial privileges, or other safeguards, al-
215. Id. at 499.
216. Id. at 500.
217. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 548.
218. Id. at 550.
219. Id. at 551.
220. Id. at 552.
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leviate the necessity for testimony as to the mode and manner of
the married couples' sexual relations, or at least the opportunity
for the accused to make denial of the charges. 22'
Thus, while there is a sharp difference in due process methodology
between Harlan and Douglas's opinion for the Court, and an equally
visible difference in the level of craftsmanship displayed, they are
united in their emphasis on protecting marital privacy and they
share a common hypothetical fear. Douglas asks: "Would we allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive




Concurring also in the Court's judgment but failing to join its
opinion was Mr. Justice White. He shared Harlan's view of due
process, spoke not of privacy, but directly of liberty, and found the
Connecticut statute too "sweeping' 223 in scope, given the freedom
restricted by it, the statute's purpose (preventing promiscuous or
illicit sexual relationships), its history of nonenforcement, and the
general "availability [of contraceptive devices] in that state . ,;224
Mr. Justice Black dissented: Due Process incorporates the first
eight amendments; it has no additional independent force. Harlan's
approach is different from the Court's in Lochner only to the extent
that Harlan's personal values are different from those of Mr. Justice
Peckham. If Pierce and Meyer are good law, they are good law be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First. Nor was
Black persuaded by the Court's theory: "I like my privacy as well
as the next one," he said, "but I am nevertheless compelled to admit
that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some
specific constitutional provision.1
225
Mr. Justice Stewart found himself equally unpersuaded by the
opinion of the Court and unable to distinguish the discredited
Lochner line from the case before him.
226
27.
The Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute, according to Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan, embodied a "moral judgment that all use of contracep-
221. Id. at 548.
222. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
223. Id. at 507.
224. Id. at 505.
225. Id. at 510.
226. Id. at 527-31.
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tives [including use by married couples] is improper." 227 The Justice
tells us that "[a]ppellants cite an impressive list of authorities who,
from a great variety of points of view, commend the considered use of
contraceptives by married couples. ' 228 He goes on to say:
[N]ot too long ago the current of opinion was very probably
quite the opposite . . . and . .. even today the issue is not free
of controversy. Certainly, Connecticut's judgment is no more
demonstrably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judg-
ment, expressed in law, on marriage and divorce, on adult con-
sensual homosexuality, abortion, and sterilization or euthanasia
and suicide. If we had a case before us which required us to de-
cide simply and in abstraction, whether the moral judgment im-
plicit in the application of the present statute to married couples
was a sound one, the very controversial nature of these questions
would, I think, require us to hesitate long before concluding that
the Constitution precluded Connecticut from choosing as it has
among these various views.
229
There seems to be little conviction in Harlan's defense of what
he calls Connecticut's moral judgment banning the use of contra-
ceptives by married persons. He tells us that "even today the issue
is not free of controversy" and he attempts to strengthen the con-
stitutional validity of the statute considered in abstract by lumping
birth control with euthanasia and suicide. What is important to
recognize, however, is the meaning of Harlan's statement "that the
State of Connecticut has expressed its moral judgment that all use
of contraceptives is improper."230 Whatever the Justice may have
thought this meant, it can only mean that in 1879 an active, or-
ganized, and legitimate group was successful in persuading the legis-
lature to enact the anti-use law, that in the intervening years no
other group had been successful in obtaining its repeal, and that
the law embodies a moral judgment.
At the time of the Griswold case, the moral judgment contained
in the statute, on analysis, would seem to be inconsistent with con-
ventional morality. As I have argued, the task of the Court is to
make that analysis and connect it with constitutional doctrine with-
out the usual deference to the legislature or presumption that the
statute is constitutional. So much is required by a realistic appraisal
of comparative institutional competences. The analysis cannot, how-
227. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 546.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 547.
230. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
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ever, satisfy one who demands mathematical exactness: He is bound
to find all law disappointing.
The place to begin analysis is with Harlan's statement that "the
intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State
not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fos-
tered and protected." 23' This intimacy resists standardization through
a detailed official code of behavior and only the most general legal
controls may be placed on it. Enormous discretion for working out
the particulars of the relationship must belong to each couple.
I take agreement upon the existence of this discretion to be a cen-
tral part of the compact made by a husband and wife with the
state at the time of marriage. It is a compact that creates a complex
of moral as well as legal rights and obligations on the part of the
couple and the state, rights and obligations intrinsic to the insti-
tution of marriage, that change as the institution changes, but that
have and retain a logical, internal consistency.
The functional need for discretion establishes the area of liberty
(or privacy, if one insists) granted to individuals in marriage. This
liberty imposes two types of moral obligations: one between husband
and wife, the other between the couple and the state. Interference
by the state with this granted liberty can intrude on the marriage
relationship in ways that are profoundly at variance with the mar-
riage compact.
Apart from the personal degradation that would be endured if
the Connecticut statute were enforced, one might ask whether the
statute does not substantially interfere with a major reason for mar-
riage. Is not part of the compact the establishment of a state pro-
tected institution for the nurturing and growth of love? Is not the
pursuit of sexual gratification a vital aspect of love? And does not
the fear of unwanted pregnancy materially reduce the prospects of
sexual gratification?
Love and sexual gratification can and do exist outside of marriage
and they can and do fail to exist in marriage, but this is not the
point. The point is that the state has undertaken to sponsor one
institution that has at its core the love-sex relationship. That rela-
tionship demands liberty in the practice of the sexual act.
The Connecticut statute is, therefore, as Harlan seems to suggest,
an arguably unconstitutional condition on the privileges that flow
231. Id. at 553.
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from a state-supported institution. "It is one thing when the State
exerts its power either to forbid extramarital sexuality altogether,
or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having ac-
knowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it under-
takes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy."2
32
To determine whether the ban on the use of contraceptives is
indeed an unconstitutional condition in the marriage context re-
quires further rumination and reflection in the quest to find con-
ventional morality. Thus far, the argument is that the act of mar-
riage entitles the married couple to a large area of liberty in respect
to their love life and that the Connecticut statute restricts that
liberty. The claim is not that there are no limits on liberty; one
would hesitate to urge that the state cannot regulate at all, for, as
I have insisted, conventional morality, rather than the morality of
some wise philosopher, is the test.
Let me, then, make some assertions that I submit are clear in this
society: The state would be taken to have broken its moral obliga-
tion, arising from its compact, were it to ban sexual intercourse be-
tween married couples or were it to regulate the frequency, the day,
or the time of day that intercourse was to be permitted. And while
such hypothetical regulations are distinguishable from a prohibition
on the use of contraceptives, the distinction with respect to the second
hypothetical is more apparent than real.
A ban on intercourse would be a clear violation of the compact
between the state and the couple and, for this reason, it is difficult
to imagine the simultaneous existence of such a ban and marriage
in anything resembling its present form. This is not the case, how-
ever, with respect to a statute stipulating the occasions on which a
couple's sexual appetite may be indulged. Yet such a statute would
be deeply inconsistent and in sharp conflict with the entire concept
of the marriage relationship. It reminds one of the fine print in a
contract for the sale and purchase of an automobile that totally con-
tradicts the general import of the transaction; 23 3 it smacks of fraud.
232. Id. Harlan's emphasis, of course, was on the criminal nature of the Connecticut
law and the consequences to marital intimacy attendant on its enforcement. This drove
him to develop a privacy justification for his holding and, as it seems to me, an undue
reliance on the Fourth Amendment and its protection of life in the home.
233. The leading case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960). In another context, I said this:
It will be recalled that [Henningsen and similar cases] involve the legal effect of
promises made by a manufacturer, and contained in the contract of sale, dealing
with the liability of the manufacturer for injury resulting from defective auto-
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And so, too, does the Connecticut statute, given its potential effect
on the love life of the married couple and contraceptive practices
in Connecticut circa 1965.
First, the ban could dramatically diminish pleasure because of
the fear of unwanted pregnancy. There can be no question that
this can impose a major strain on the state-protected relationship.
Second, prior to the Connecticut statute's invalidation, legal con-
sequences were not imposed on married couples for using birth con-
trol devices. Third, some types of contraceptives could be purchased
at any drugstore in the state.
234
Points two and three are, to be sure, merely bits of evidence rele-
vant to the task of determining conventional morality in the context
of the question whether the anti-use statute is an unconstitutional
condition on the marriage compact. While various inferences may
be drawn from the evidence, and while some common behavior is
widely regarded as immoral even by those who engage in it, the evi-
dence of public acceptance of contraceptive practices is far more
compelling than 'the existence of the statute which had some rele-
vance to moral views in 1879, but carries little weight 85 years later.
Points two and three are some evidence and there is substantially
less evidence to the contrary. They represent, therefore, a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in a situation in which no more is re-
quired because of the nature of the underlying question presented
to the Court.
If I am correct in my analysis of conventional morality with re-
spect to the Connecticut statute and in my observations about
Lochner, Meyer and Pierce represent powerful legal precedent for
the holding in Griswold. Penumbras were not necessary, zones
of privacy, an unfortunate invention, and reliance on the Fourth
Amendment, a mistake. Nor does the correctness of the Griswold
decision depend upon Harlan's understanding of the Connecticut
statute as embodying that state's 1879 moral judgment. Mr. Justice
mobiles. Courts have paid less and less attention to the exculpatory terms of such
promises (or warranties as they are called) which. . . . are written by one party
and accepted by another who has little choice and who is not likely to read or
understand. The growing trend is toward strict manufacturer's liability-that is,
liability irrespective of language or negligence-for an injury resulting from de-
fective automobiles. One might well justify these cases . . . in terms of a general
holding forth. Here it is a holding forth by the manufacturers in their sales cam-
paigns of an automobile that is safe to drive. This holding forth is a major factor
in determining fairness between purchaser and maker, and creates a community
morality, departure from which the courts may properly consider a violation of
community standards appropriately enshrined in law.
H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 43, at 197.
234. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 506 (White, J., concurring).
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White understood the statute as effectuating the State's opposition
to "all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they
premarital or extramarital .... O2350ne may, as White did, find this,
unlike Harlan's understanding of the statute, a "legitimate legislative
goal," but its effect upon the marriage compact when understood in the
light of the foregoing discussion supports White's conclusion: There
is "nothing in this record justifying the sweeping scope of this statute,
with its telling effect on the freedom of married persons, and there-
fore [I] conclude that it deprives such persons of liberty without
due process of law.
' 230
28.
Two issues were left open by Griswold. First, on neither the theory
of the Court nor of Mr. Justice Harlan may the case be cited as
authority for the proposition that a state statute prohibiting the dis-
tribution of contraceptives to married persons is unconstitutional.
The Connecticut statute was unconstitutional because it made crim-
inal the use of a contraceptive device by a married couple. For both
the Court and Harlan, it was the invasion of privacy attendant upon
the statute's hypothetical enforcement that was decisive. For both, a
prohibition on distribution, therefore, would raise a discrete question.
In this respect, the rationale I have suggested for Griswold is
broader: To virtually the same extent as a ban on use, a prohibition
on the distribution of contraceptives to married couples would im-
pinge on the area of sexual freedom writ large in the print of the
marriage compact.
Second, my rationale of Griswold surely would not invalidate a
use or distribution statute that excluded from its reach the married
couple. Such a statute would raise different questions from those
discussed in the last section of these notes, and would require a
markedly different analysis, albeit an analysis within the general
framework appropriate to constitutional principles.
Harlan's opinions also leave open the constitutionality of a use
statute that excludes the married couple. His analysis is strongly
dependent upon the marriage relationship and privacy within that
relationship. Moreover, the Court in Griswold makes less, but still a
very great deal, of that relationship: "Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the de-
gree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
235. Id. at 505.
236. Id. at 507.
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not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."2 37
The first of Griswold's open issues remained undecided at the time
of judgment in the abortion cases. The second issue, however, had
been decided inferentially (that is to say by way of equal protection,
rather than due process) and by assertion, without a pretext of rea-
soning, in the spring of 1972.
Eisenstadt v. Baird238 brought to the Court a Massachusetts statute
that made it illegal for single persons, but not for married persons,
to obtain contraceptives in order to prevent pregnancy. The Court
held that this statute was neither a health measure nor intended as
a deterrence to premarital sexual relations. It was (where it applied)
"simply . . . a prohibition on contraception." 239 As such it repre-
sented, in the limited sense described earlier, the state's moral
judgment.
Given this purpose, the Court considered it unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the statute violated the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. A narrower ground was available. Quoting from
an earlier opinion, the Court said: "'The Equal Protection Clause
of that amendment . . . does . . . deny to States the power to legis-
late that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated
to the objective of the statute.' ",240
Of course, whether the "different classes" (married, not married)
are "wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute" depends on
whether, as Griswold insists, the marriage relationship is important
to that aspect of liberty that the Court calls privacy.241 How, then,
without offering a new rationale for Griswold, can the Court say:
237. Id. at 486. On the importance of the marriage relationship in another due
process context, compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), with United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
238. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
239. Id. at 452.
240. Id. at 447. The quote is from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). In
Eisenstadt, the Court stated that it was to apply the old ("rationally related") equal
protection, and not the new ("compelling state interest") equal protection of Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See 405 U.S. at 447 n.7; Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Cf. Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
241. This is so even though the Massachusetts statute allowed distribution of con-
traceptives to married persons, without trying to make the administratively difficult
determination of whether its use will be in an adulterous relationship. Cf. Postal
Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
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If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried
persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Gris-
wold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-
up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
242
On the other hand, if Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on
the distribution of contraceptives, the State could not, consistently
with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to un-
married but not to married persons. In each case the evil, as
perceived by the State, would be identical, and the underinclusion
would be invidious 243
With any effort at analysis thus abandoned, the stage was set for
the abortion cases.
J. Substantive Due Process: Abortion
29.
Eisenstadt v. Baird set the stage for Roe v. Wade244 in the fol-
lowing sense: Harlan in Poe v. Ullman had undertaken a painstak-
ingly careful inquiry into the concept of liberty protected through
due process. While in my judgment his opinion strays from the cor-
rect approach, it is nevertheless an example of a proper judicial
inquiry. The concept of liberty is not dealt with at large and in the
abstract. It is addressed in the special context of the Connecticut
statute and that statute's impact on the institution of marriage.
The Court in Griswold essentially follows Harlan. True, the crafts-
manship is lacking and, of course, the issue is obfuscated by the
Court's employment of a cumbersome methodology. But one feels a
sense of concern with the limits of judicial power. Indeed, that con-
cern alone explains-but fails to justify-the Court's methodology.
A sense of concern with appropriate limits is lacking, however, in
Eisenstadt; the analytical struggle with the problem, abandoned or
242. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
243. Id. at 454.
244. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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begged; the momentum for an overbroad, because it is under-ana-
lyzed, due process, set in motion. Roe soon followed.
The Texas statute there declared unconstitutional was of the strict
variety: Except to save the life of the mother, it was a crime to
"procure an abortion." 245 The Court held that a pregnant woman
has a "fundamental" "right of personal privacy," "founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty . . . [which is]
broad enough to encompass the woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 241 This right "is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation. ' 24 7 Those
interests, however, must be "compelling" if they are to serve as the
justification for limiting a "fundamental" right.
248
The state, of course, has "an important and legitimate interest in
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . .
and . . . it has still another important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate
and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches
term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.' "249
The interest in the health of the mother becomes compelling "in
the light of present medical knowledge . . . at approximately the
end of the first trimester. ' 2 5 ° "With respect to the State's important
and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at
viability."' 25 1 A fetus becomes viable when it is "potentially able to
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability
is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur




It follows from this, that:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of
the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in pro-
245. Id. at 117-18.
246. Id. at 153.
247. Id. at 154.
248. Id. at 155.
249. Id. at 162-63 (emphasis in original).
250. Id. at 163.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted).
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moting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation





Roe perpetuates what seems to me a basic terminological mistake:
The Court insists on describing the plaintiff's interest as "funda-
mental. '25 4 This is misleading, for it suggests either that the text of
the Constitution has singled out the abortion decision for special
attention or that the judge, as wise philosopher, has imposed his
ethical system upon the people. My claim has been that the plain-
tiff's interest is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment by ref-
erence to the people: that the meaning of liberty in that Amendment
and its weight in the context of the Texas abortion statute depends,
in the first instance, upon its weight in conventional morality.
Roe, moreover, adds a new terminological mistake to substantive
due process: Regulation is to be judged under a "compelling state
interest" test.2 5 This may be just another way of saying that the
scope of judicial review in this context is "strict scrutiny" of legis-
lation, rather than "the plausibility of its underlying rationale." Yet
the formulation does not help analysis and in Roe it seems seriously
to have misled the Court in dealing with the state's interest in pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant woman.
With respect to health and the appropriate scope of judicial review,
contrast the legislature's institutional competence in dealing with
matters of health and its competence in forming a judgment on the
morality of people using contraceptives. Consider whether the Court's
capacity is identical in both these cases or whether, as it seems to
me, it is strong where the legislature is weak and vice versa.
In terms of comparative institutional competence, the regulation
of health matters and the regulation of economic affairs are much
the same. Judicial deference to legislative judgments on matters of
economics and health are required. This does not mean that in the
253. Id. at 164-65.
254. For disagreement as to the meaning of "fundamental" in an equal protection
case, see the opinions in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278
(1973).
255. [T]he Court adds a new wrinkle to [the compelling state interest] test by
transposing it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal Protection
Clause . . . .Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting of the
"compelling state interest test," the Court's opinion will accomplish the seemingly
impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it.
410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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context of economic legislation a question of economic liberty may
not be raised. Nor does it mean that personal liberty may not be
seriously in question where legislation addresses health practices.
If one can put aside the state's interest "in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life," the abortion cases nicely pose the question
of judicial activism and judicial deference-as it used to be called-
in the health field.
In Roe the Court undertook to show, by citing some studies, that,
whatever may have been the danger of abortion in 1854 when the
Texas statute was enacted, it now is the case that "[m]ortality rates
for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal,
appear to be as low or lower than rates for normal childbirth." 2ro
Indeed, "until the end of the first trimester mortality on abortion
is less than mortality in normal childbirth. ' '2- 7
If this conclusion were scientifically impeccable, then the Texas
statute-on the assumption that its only purpose is to protect the
health of the pregnant woman-may fail under a rationality testy.2 5
If several scientifically impeccable studies showed that normal child-
birth is twice as dangerous to the mother as abortion during the




Another way to put this is to suggest that even if the woman's
interest in abortion (her liberty) counted no more than economic
liberty counts today, the state's interest in protecting the woman's
health might not be sufficient to save the Texas statute from an
'attack under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This, however, hardly justifies the Court's holding that during
the first trimester "the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that
in his medical judgment the pregnancy should be terminated" and
that "[i]f that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated
by an abortion free of interference by the State. '260 This means, I
take it, that the state may not require that the abortion be per-
formed by someone who has been specially trained, in a hospital,
only after consultation with one or more other physicians, and so
forth. This means that the state may neither undertake, through
256. Id. at 149.
257. Id. at 163.
258. But see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 942 n.117 (1973).
259. A. Bicax., supra note 118, at 35.
260. 410 U.S. at 163.
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laws specifically directed at abortions, to insure that a woman has
genuinely consented, understanding the potential psychological ef-
fect abortion may have on her, nor may it attempt directly to up-
grade her physical safety.
One would suppose that legislation of that sort aimed at any of
the trimesters of pregnancy would satisfy anyone's test of rationality.
Jndeed, it is legislation that may even be wise. And the legislature
is able better than the Court to make that instrumental decision.
The Court, however, has two grounds for precluding the state
from enacting protective health legislation during the first trimester.
First, in Doe v. Bolton261 (the companion of Roe), it invalidated
legislation requiring, among other things, that more than one phy-
sician approve an abortion. Its reason seems to be that this require-
ment irrationally singles out abortion for special treatment:
The reasons for the presence of the confirmation step in the
statute are perhaps apparent, but they are insufficient to with-
stand constitutional challenge .... [N]o other voluntary medical
or surgical procedure for which Georgia requires confirmation
by two other physicians has been cited to us. If a physician is
licensed by the State, he is recognized by the State as capable
of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this,
professional censure or deprivation of his license are available
remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no ra-
tional connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on
the physician's right to practice.
26 2
This ruling on the Georgia confirmation requirement apparently
covers the second and third trimester as well as the first; that is, it
invalidates legislation even after the state's interest has become com-
pelling.
There really, is little to say about this ground and the statement
supporting it. It lacks persuasive force and treats the private phy-
sician with the reverence that one expects only from advertising
agencies employed by the American Medical Association.
The Court could have put it better had it been candid enough
to quote Lochner: "Statutes of the nature of that under review . . .
are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual,
and they are not saved from condemnation by the claim that they
are passed ... upon the subject of the health of the individual whose
261. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
262. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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rights are interfered with ... ."263 We now are fairly well agreed
that New York should have been able to single out bakeries as
raising special health problems. It is also the case that Georgia should
have been able to single out abortions.
The second reason advdnced by the Court for precluding a state
from enacting protective health legislation is simply the flat assertion
that during the first trimester the state's interest is not "compelling."
Yet the Court does hold that it is compelling enough to sustain
legislation proscribing "any abortion by a person who is not a phy-
sician ..
That concession gives the game away. Why, during the first tri-
mester, is the woman not constitutionally entitled to have her abor-
tion performed by anyone or at least by a para-medical? The answer
is that it is too dangerous; her right is not that fundamental. Why
then may the state not require that, before an abortion can be per-
formed, the woman must consult some professional specifically trained
to explain the potential psychological effects of that abortion; or
that the abortion be performed in a state-certified facility? It must
be that in the Court's medical judgment neither is necessary.
Of course lines have to be drawn. Medical procedures cannot be
used by the state to circumvent the Court's holding in chief; but
considerable deference on matters of health should be accorded the
legislature.
I am bound to say, however, that even if I am wrong as to the
appropriate scope of judicial review, even if review of health matters
should be searching, the Court has failed to make its case. Search as
one may, he will not discover why a woman's liberty is constitution-
ally impaired if her safety is improved or her consent assured. She
may be inconvenienced somewhat, but surely that is not the issue.
Liberty cannot mean instantaneous gratification. Even the First
Amendment grants no such right.
2 65
31.
Unlike health and like contraception, legislation "protecting the
potentiality of human life"2 66 should be subject to searching judicial
review, for it is natural to think of such legislation as addressing a
moral issue directly. While important instrumental or policy rea-
263. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
264. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165.
265. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
266. 410 U.S. at 162.
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sons may be adduced for such legislation-economic growth, for in-
stance-they are plainly secondary. The state of Texas had made
its moral judgment on fetal life in the same sense that Connecticut,
in Griswold, had pronounced its judgment on the morality of con-
traception. - 7
In the procedural posture of the Roe case, review of the state's
judgment on fetal life was mandated by the plaintiff's claim that
that judgment impermissibly abridged her liberty.28 The issue for
the Court was how to weigh her interest in that liberty. This re-
quired inquiry into the nature of the principle the plaintiff was
asserting and attention to the principle the state had vindicated.269
The Court itself approached the case more or less along these
lines. It did not, however, get far. Indeed, much of Mr. Justice
Blackmun's opinion is devoted to a history of abortion and is related
only remotely to the task at hand.270 We are told that the constitu-
tional principle asserted by the plaintiff is an aspect of the "right
of privacy," "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . ,,*"271 The pri-
vacy rationale was not helpful in Griswold, but given the Court's
approach and even Harlan's, it was understandable. In Roe it is un-
derstandable only because of Griswold. This is not a good excuse,
for in the abortion case "privacy" obfuscates rather than elucidates
the concept of liberty. The Court itself seems to have understood
this: "The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy ....
The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy,
or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procrea-
tion or education .... -272 Yet, the Court offers no explanation for
its Pickwickian usage.
The Court does have this to say, and it is relevant to the prin-
ciple the plaintiff is asserting.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether [whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy] is apparent. Specific and direct harm medi-
cally diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Ma-
267. See p. 291 supra.
268. The issue of the constitutional rights of the fetus was not raised independ-
ently. Nor can it be, for the Court held that a fetus is not a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 410 U.S. at 158.
269. It is because a principle is being vindicated, rather than a policy effectuated,
that the Court should engage in more searching review.
270. 410 U.S. at 130-52.
271. Id. at 153.
272. Id. at 159.
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ternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There
is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un-
wanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into
a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care
for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved..2 73
But this and the citation of a number of cases (Eisenstadt, Griswold,
Pierce, and Meyer, for instance) are all the Court has to say on this
branch of the case.
The Court does no better when it undertakes to examine the prin-
ciple that the state advances in justification for prohibiting the
plaintiff from terminating her pregnancy. First, a fetus is not a per-
son within the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Second, the Court does
not know "when life begins." 75 It does know that "the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."
27
And third, "[i]n view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting
one theory of life [namely, that it "begins at conception and is present
throughout pregnancy"],27 7 Texas may override the rights of the
pregnant woman that are at stake.
2 7 8
32.
Consider a statute making it a crime for any person to remove
another person's gall bladder, except to save that person's life. As-
sume the express purpose of the statute is to preserve gall bladders,
it being determined that such organs can survive only so long as
they are housed within a living person's body.
I think "this is an uncommonly silly law" (as Mr. Justice Stewart
said of the Connecticut contraception statute). 79 I think also that
273. Id. at 153.
274. Id. at 158. The Court seems to suggest that, if a fetus were a person within
the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutionality of the Texas statute would be se-
cure. But "person" is not a unitary concept as cases involving corporations show, and,
even if it were, it is possible to argue for a limited right to abortion. See pp. 306-08
infra. If the fetus were considered a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, its
rights-whatever they might be-would limit the extent to which a state could grant
a right to an abortion. Roe tells the states when they must grant such a right. It does
not say that a state may not permit abortion in additional situations.
275. Id. at 159.
276. Id. at 162.
277. Id. at 159.
278. Id. at 162.
279. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965).
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it is unconstitutional, that it deprives any person with a diseased
gall bladder of his or her liberty without due process of law..
2 80
It is, to be sure, bizarre for a state legislature to concern itself
with the survival of sick gall bladders. It is understandable that it
be concerned with the survival of the unborn. This is not, however,
the aspect of the problem to which I would now draw attention.
I wish to examine the claim of the plaintiff that the gall bladder
statute deprives him of his liberty. What is the principle that he is
asserting and how does it relate to the principle urged upon the
Court in Roe?
His claim is that he is entitled to rid himself of an organ that has
caused him acute pain and may again, that to harbor that organ
within his body imposes upon him a regimen that he finds highly
uncongenial, and that the mental strain of a potential rupture is,
to him, psychologically unsettling. The principle that he relates this
to is one that is commonly recognized, namely, that every person
has a right (qualified by context) to decide what happens in or to
his body. 2
81
The obvious point to notice about that principle (and it is, of
course, the principle asserted by the plaintiff in Roe) is its generality:
It applies alike to female and male. Notice, however, a less obvious
and, with respect to abortion, more important point: The principle
itself has nothing to do with the destruction of the diseased gall
bladder once it is removed or with the death of a fetus once removed
from the womb.
28 2
Writing in defense of abortion, Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson
put it this way:
[W]hile I am arguing for the permissibility of abortion in some
cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the
unborn child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up
280. If one does not believe that this statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
then he really does not believe in substantive due process. He can content himself
with the methodology of the Court in Griswold (which is back door substantive due
process), follow Mr. Justice Black, or take his stand with Judge Learned Hand (which
means he really does not believe in judicial review). See L. HA~xN, supra note 121,
at 1-30.
281. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. 9= Pun. AFFAIRS 47, 48 (1971). See
Rehnquist, J., dissenting in Roe v. Wade: "If the Court means by the term 'privacy'
no more than that the claim of a person to be free from unwanted state regulation
of consensual transactions may be a form of 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no doubt that similar claims have been upheld in our earlier
decisions on the basis of liberty." 410 U.S. at 172.
282. This explains why there is no necessary inconsistency in favoring abortion
and disapproving of experimentation with a live but doomed fetus. See TiNIE, July
30, 1973, at 71.
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to a certain point in the life of the fetus it is not able to sur-
vive outside the mother's body; hence removing it from her
body guarantees its death. But they are importantly different.
A woman may be utterly devastated by the thought of a child, a
bit of herself, put out for adoption and never seen or heard of
again. She may therefore want not merely that the child be de-
tached from her, but more, that it die. Some opponents of
abortion are inclined to regard this as beneath contempt-there-
by showing insensitivity to what is surely a powerful source of
despair. All the same, I agree that the desire for the child's
death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out
to be possible to detach the child alive.
283
If this is, as it seems to me, correct and if medical science were
to advance to such a state that, after twelve weeks, fetuses could be
sustained as viable entities in surrogate wombs with a survival rate
the same as that of naturally born infants, then the pregnant woman's
claim to having the fetus removed and the claim of my poor fellow
with the bad gall bladder would be identical. Each could justify
his claim by an appeal to the same principle in a context that is
different but not distinguishable. It should be observed, moreover,
that since the principle appealed to by the plaintiff in Roe does
not support an independent claim to "secure the death of the un-
born child," there is some logic in the Court fixing on viability as
the point at which substantial state regulation is permissible.284 At
that point, quite apart from how one counts fetal life, the woman
may still plausibly claim that she wants the fetus removed. She has
no claim, however, to a procedure that entails the destruction of
the fetus if the state provides a procedure that does not.28 5
33.
Assume for a short time the validity of Texas's position in Roe,
namely, that "life begins at conception and is present throughout
pregnancy -...8 Does the acceptance of this assumption (or its
283. Thomson, supra note 281, at 66.
284. The Court itself gives no reason for settling on viability: "With respect to
the State's . . . interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is
so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb." 410 U.S. at 163.
As Professor Ely has said: "[T]he Court's defense seems to mistake a definition for a
syllogism." Ely, supra note 258, at 924.
285. One may query whether Roe is a "definitive" decision. Medical technology
may overtake it, for it seems likely that viability will be achievable earlier and earlier.
I would suppose that this would mean that abortion entailing destruction of the fetus
can be precluded earlier and earlier, at least if an alternative procedure for the re.
moval of the fetus is made available.
286. 410 U.S. at 159.
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rhetorically more provocative version that the "fetus [embryo, fer-
tilized ovum] is a person from the moment of conception 28 7) neces-
sarily conclude the abortion issue? This is the question to which
Professor Thomson attends in her short and splendid article from
which I have just quoted. She has a good deal to say, all of it is
interesting and some of it important to a proper understanding of
Roe.
Given the assumption about fetal life (that she does not believe but
accepts arguendo), Thomson wisely declines to defend an unquali-
fied right to abortion. Her argument, nevertheless, is heroic: Some
abortions, she claims, are justified by resort to the principle that
"the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her
body." 288 Her major forensic tool is a vivid analogy:
[L]et me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning
and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious vio-
linist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to
have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers
has canvassed all the available medical records and found that
you alone have the right blood type to help. They have there-
fore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory sys-
tem was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used
to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The di-
rector of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the
Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would never have
permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the
violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to
kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then
he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be un-
plugged from you." Is it morally incumbent on you to accede
to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you
did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it?289
Thomson's question is meant to be answered "no," and it seems to
me that "no" is the only answer that can be defended by an appeal
to our attitudes and practices. 90 Nor do I see how her example can
be distinguished from abortion where pregnancy results from rape.
Even if one does not grant this much (and I am sure there are
those who will not), some features of Thomson's position are worth
287. Thomson, supra note 281, at 48.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 48-49 (emphasis in original).
290. Id. at 62-66. Compare Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply
to Judith Thomson, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 117 (1973), with Thomson, Rights and
Deaths, id. at 146.
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noticing.2 ' First, the violinist case would be very different if "you"
had to be plugged into his circulatory system for nine minutes rather
than nine months. The principle, that one is entitled to decide what
happens in and to one's body, must not only be accommodated to
other principles but must be flexible enough to tolerate relatively
minor violations even for relatively minor reasons. Time is impor-
tant and so too is the nature of the violation. A compulsory vaccina-
tion is different on both counts from a compulsory pregnancy. - "-'
Second, if "you" agTeed to be plugged into the violinist, your
moral position, of course, would be dramatically changed. This may
seem to diminish the claim to abortion of a woman who becomes
pregnant after having consented to intercourse. But her situation is
different and, while observable differences do not mean that she
should prevail if the fetus is assumed to be indistinguishable in any
relevant way from the violinist, they do suggest, to the extent it is
possible to relax this assumption, that consent counts for less than
might be thought.
The woman may have taken all the precautions she could. Con-
traception is not foolproof and "assumption of risk" can be pushed
too hard. Sexual intercourse is not voluntary in the same way that
going to a baseball game or agreeing to be plugged into a violinist
is voluntary. It makes sense to speak of voluntariness in contrast to
rape, but confusion on this issue should be carefully avoided. To
say that Betty goes to the opera voluntarily, Betty voluntarily has
sexual intercourse, and Betty voluntarily eats food is not to say that
in each case Betty has exercised the same degree of volition.
On the other hand, even if sexual intercourse were-as eating is
-a matter of life or death, the woman who became pregnant (but
was not raped) is not in the position of Thomson's kidnapee, for
the kidnapee received no benefit from being plugged into the vio-
linist.
34.
I think that it is not only possible to relax the assumption that
a fetus is like the violinist, but, indeed, that the assumption is im-
possible to maintain. Let me call attention to an attitudinal dif-
ference that I believe is quite generally held. In order to save the
life of the mother, we are prepared to accept the death of the
291. I do not mean to claim that Professor Thomson would agree with all that
follows.
292. Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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fetus. Even Texas provided for this. Indeed, "[s]imilar statutes are in
existence in a majority of the states. ' '2 13 However, suppose that the
fetus is removed and placed in an incubator because it appears that
it can live. Two days later it is determined that the mother will die
if she does not receive a small blood transfusion. The only blood
available that matches hers is the infant's in the incubator. He will
survive if he keeps his blood but will die and the mother sur-
vive if he gives it up. I do not think we are now prepared to kill
the infant to save the mother.
We are not prepared to kill the infant to save the mother for
reasons already remarked, namely, that the principle which sup-
ports some abortions does not give the "right to secure the death
of [even] the unborn child." But we are prepared to accept that
death to save the mother. We are not prepared to accept the death
of the infant in the incubator, however, because most of us per-
ceive the fetus to have less of a right to life than the infant. Indeed,
the infant has as much of a right to life as the violinist, for it would
not matter if his mother were a virtuoso.
To take another example, we are not apt to be surprised by, or to
think it madness if, a person favors the abortion of a badly de-
formed fetus and, at the same time, opposes infanticide. This again
is an example of the nature of the principle appealed to in support
of a limited right to abortion, but it too reflects a difference in at-
titude toward fetal and infant life. Surely we would be bewildered
by one who favored infanticide and opposed abortion.
294
35.
The example of the deformed fetus purports to show that its sur-
vival counts less than the survival of a deformed infant. It does not
purport to say anything about the morality of aborting such a fetus.
It is to this that I now turn. The claim I want to make is that, if
one agrees with the main features of the argument thus far, common
sense requires permitting abortion here.
Consider the following story: Mary and Jane are identical twins.
Mary was married in the summer and went to Europe on her honey-
moon. She became pregnant and found it difficult to sleep. She went
to a physician and was given thalidomide which helped a great deal.
Shortly thereafter, evidence of the effects of thalidomide on the de-
293. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 118.
294. One of course can be against both, for different reasons, or for both.
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velopment of the fetus was published. Mary, learning of her pre-
dicamcnt, seeks moral counsel.
The summer Mary was honeymooning in Europe, Jane was work-
ing in New York. While walking alone one afternoon she was as-
saulted and forcibly raped. A month later she discovered that, as a
result of the rape, she had become pregnant. She too seeks counsel.
The sisters go together.
We can explain to Jane that she would be a very nice person if
she carried the fetus to term, but that it is morally permissible for
her to have an abortion, even if the fetus were considered "a per-
son from the moment of conception."
Having told this to Jane, what shall we say to Mary? I do not
think that we can now tell her that it is impermissible for her to
have an abortion and at the same time persuade ourselves that we
are being fair to her. Nor do I think we have to. We can say to
Mary (1) that we do commonly draw important moral distinctions
between fetal life and other kinds of human life, (2) that this dis-
tinction does not mean that fetal life may be disregarded, but that
it does enable us to make distinctions that otherwise would be mor-
ally impermissible, (3) that one such distinction, which has consider-
able intuitive appeal, counts the survival of a fetus that "would be
born with grave physical or mental defect"2 95 less than the survival
of a normal fetus, and (4) that while the chief appeal of the distinc-
tion roots in a widely held preference for the birth of a healthy
child, it figures in the weight to be given the principle that a woman
"has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body." Sup-
port for the final conclusion may be found in two observations.
First, it is, as a general rule, emotionally more painful for a woman
knowingly to carry an unwanted defective fetus than it is for her
to carry an unwanted healthy fetus. Second, when she engaged in
intercourse, the chance of her having to carry a gravely defective
fetus was a knowable risk, but-if we can argue from a conclusion-
a risk she did not assume. For it is permissible, in assessing the de-
gree of risk assumed, to notice the degree of volition involved in
the act creating the risk in the first place. In this respect, Mary is
not Jane; but neither is sexual intercourse going to an opera.
36.
The arguments I have been making take us about as far as is pos-
sible by noticing commonly held attitudes and reasoning from them.
295. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3, reproduced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 205-07.
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This is a method for discovering conventional morality and I take
some comfort in the fact that the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code also would permit abortion for rape, to save the life of
the mother, or if "the child would be born with gTave physical or
mental defect."'298 The work of the Institute is a check of sorts. Its
conclusions are some evidence of society's moral position on these
questions. It is, indeed, better evidence than state legislation, for
the Institute, while not free of politics, is not nearly as subject to
the pressures of special interest groups as is a legislature.
The Institute, however, would permit abortion in additional situa-
tions, most importantly where there was "a substantial risk that con-
tinuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or
mental health of the mother. '297 I would like to be able to find
support for that position in conventional morality, for it surely
coincides with my personal preference. But the Institute's position
is here the best evidence there is and that does not seem enough.
I do not understand how, by noticing commonly held attitudes, one
can conclude that a healthy fetus is less important than a sick mother.
Of course (and this is something of a paradox, for what the In-
stitute recommends is some evidence of conventional morality), the
Institute may propose to enlarge the woman's rights beyond what
an appeal to conventional morality indicates she is entitled and
a legislature can follow the Institute's proposals or go well beyond.
Even apart from the woman's health, for example, it can (although I
do not believe conventional morality does) consider the stage of
fetal development.
The Supreme Court, however, has no such mandate when elaborat-
ing the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment. Conven-
tional morality is the outer limit of the Court's legitimate authority
and a proper understanding of substantive due process indicates, as
I have attempted to show, that it is also much of what this branch
of constitutional law is about.298 In this respect, Roe v. Wade, as a
legal problem, is not very different from the insurance case and
Lochner resembles those rejected cantaloupes.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. It is also a good deal of what the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishment" is about. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). More-
over, the same could be said of obscenity if one were to divorce it from the protection
afforded political speech by the First Amendment, for one would then view it as an
aspect of substantive due process. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973); note 127 supra.
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